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JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE
RECENT ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BANKING REGULATORS *
LAWRENCE G. BAXTER **

W

INTRODUCTION

0among us would want to be the author of a treatise on internaW Ytional relations, publication date January 1989? Perhaps worse,
who would like to be the author of such a treatise, publication date July
31, 1990? Like the Defenestration of Prague on Ascension Day, May 23,
1618,1 irritable-even tragi-comical--events were only dimly perceived
as portending the avalanche of change during the past two years. So too,
the disputes between Don Regan and Ed Gray,2 the delay by Speaker Jim
Wright of the passage of the first of the bailout measures in 1987, 3 and
the skirmishes between the banking agencies and the banking industry
* Paper presented on April 12, 1991, as part of the Fordham University School of
Law's Graduate Colloquium 1990-1991, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration.
This paper is a pilot for a study being prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United States on the enforcement powers of the federal banking agencies. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Conference, its members or its staff. The author wishes to thank Paul H. Haagen, Dennis
J. Lehr, Roy A. Schotland, Peter H. Schuck and Peter L. Strauss for their generous and
helpful comments on drafts of this paper. Special thanks are also due to Brian C.
Murphy for enthusiastically and energetically securing much of the material on which the
paper is based.
** Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. See G. Parker, Europe in Crisis: 1598-1648, 13 (1979).
2. See, e.g., M. Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry 133-39, 157-58 (1990) [hereinafter Mayer, Bank Robbery]
(describing the disputes between the White House Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) over the latter's efforts to restrict the use by
S&Ls of brokered deposits and direct investments, the former's opposition to the "reregulation" of the S&L industry, and Regan's efforts to have Gray replaced as chairman of
the FHLBB); J. R. Adams, The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal 235-37 (1990) [hereinafter Adams, Big Fix] (Gray's clashes with Regan); S. Pizzo, M. Fricker & P. Muolo,
Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans 177-84 (1989) [hereinafter
Pizzo et al., Inside Job] (similar). But cf. L. J. White, The S&L Debacle: Public Policy
Lessons for bank and Thrift Regulation 126-28 (1991) [hereinafter White, Debacle] (explaining why the FHLBB's efforts to restrict brokered deposits was "misguided").
3. See House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, Rep. of the Special Outside
Counsel in the Matter of Speaker James C. Wright, Jr., 101st Cong., 209-13 (1989). See
generally, e.g., Mayer, Bank Robbery, supra note 2, 230-33; Pizzo, et al., Inside Job, supra
note 2, 212-18; Adams, Big Fix, supra note 2, ch. 12.
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over the scope of the agencies' enforcement powers4 hardly alerted the
nation to the crisis that was soon to break in the savings and loan and
banking industries.
Yet, as we now know, all these events were symptoms of malaises that
had surreptitiously corrupted the entire systems in which they took
place. They were the signals of collapse, of the imminent demise of old
orders and emergence of new ones. It is always difficult in the midst of
such changes to identify from whence we have come and discern whither
we are going. In the case of the S&L and banking crises, however, patterns are beginning to emerge.
In this paper I will examine the changing roles of the courts and the
agencies in the enforcement of federal banking legislation in the wake of
the Savings and Loan Crisis. These changing roles are reflections of the
fundamental transformations that are occurring both within the financial
services industry and in the broader political and regulatory environments. I will seek to demonstrate that, contrary to long-standing assumptions, parties challenging banking agency enforcement action on
judicial review are frequently successful, and that it is quite possible that
the courts will become even more active in striking down or modifying
enforcement activities.
Two explanations will be offered for why judicial activism will continue and may even increase. First, the enforcement agencies are afflicted
with conflicting missions concerning the maintenance of depository institution safety and soundness and the cleanout of the thrift and banking
industries. This multi-faceted effort appears to be generating a substantial volume of litigation which, in turn, has led to a surprising degree of
judicial intervention against the banking agencies. Second, the unprecedented exposure of taxpayers to the risk of depository institution failure
is forcing the banking agencies to adopt a vigorous, formalistic, and unduly punitive approach to banking supervision. A regulatory model
(which I call the "entrepreneurial state") has evolved, in which the agencies are, I will argue, obliged to engage in the secondary management of
depository institutions by means of coercive enforcement techniques that
seem sometimes inappropriate to the task. This is an approach that
could be at least partly ineffective and possibly even counterproductive.
In conclusion, three lines of inquiry are proposed. First, the conflict of
missions already referred to suggests a need for a greater degree of separation between the agencies that engage in general banking supervision
and those that are charged with cleaning out the deadwood in the industry. Second, a clearer distinction should be drawn between the forms of
enforcement action that are designed to exact retribution, reimbursement
and compensation, and those that are designed primarily to prevent fur4. See Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986);
Stoddard v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 23-91.
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ther deterioration in the institutions concerned. An acknowledgment of
this distinction leads to the third and final inquiry, namely whether there
should be instituted a greater degree of procedural and/or structural separation between the agency "prosecutors" (those initiating and prosecuting punitive enforcement actions) and the banking "supervisors" (those
who require enforcement powers in order to prevent the failure of
institutions).
I.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
A.

The Old World Order

The world of community banking, rendered secure for the nation by
'Old Hickory' Jackson in 1832 when he vetoed the extension of the charter of the Second Bank of the United States,- and particularly the world
of buildings associations and savings and loans, long functioned under
the gentlest glow of public scrutiny. The traditional image of the local
savings and loan association has been one of an institution intimately
concerned with the savings and housing welfare of the neighborhood. As
reporters of the S&L Crisis are wont to observe, this image was well
captured (perhaps it is more accurate to say, nurtured) by Frank Capra's
nostalgic 1946 movie, It's a WonderfulLife, in which the hero (played by
James Stewart) refuses to capitulate to the predations of the local banking competitor and, at the brink of catastrophe, is saved by the support of
a grateful and loyal community.
Of course, as the movie itself illustrates, there are good bankers and
bad bankers, but the banking and thrift industries enjoyed, in 1946 and
for another three to four decades, an almost unrivalled reputation for
integrity, public-spiritedness and cooperative disposition toward federal
and state regulators. Yet this did not mean that the industry was not
heavily regulated: on the contrary, it has been, as the Supreme Court put
it in 1947, "one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of
public callings." 6 The banking agencies had promulgated regulations
governing the powers of the industry "from its cradle to its corporate
grave," 7 and the regulators.have long been "equipped with a formidable
array of sanctions."'
Partly because of this regulatory intensity--this paternalistic ap5. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 413 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring, quoting the homily paid to President Andrew Jackson by Sen. Reed, during
Congressional debate in 1925, for exercising his veto).
6. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947).
7. People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982)(quoting Coast Federal).
8. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329 (1963).
9. "Partly" because there were surely many other contributing factors, such as the
relative simplicity and narrow scope of the financial services industry, lack of competition
from other quarters, and a shared creed among bankers and regulators, that contributed
to its stability and cooperative disposition. See generally Department of the Treasury,
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proach to banking regulation-the banking industry as a whole represented perhaps the last vestige of the "associational" ideal of the Hoover

era. 1" The prestigious and scholarly studies by the Attorney General's

Committee of the federal banking agencies1" emphasized the need to

treat the banking agencies differently from other federal agencies: the
guarantees to members of the industry against arbitrariness and indis-

criminate punishment at the hands of the agencies came not from proce-2

dural formalities but from the very nature of the agencies' supervision'
involving, as it did then (and still does), a close and continuous relationship between the regulators and the regulated, such that the resort to
formal enforcement procedure was an exceedingly rare event. 3 Speaking
in reference to the enforcement powers of the Comptroller and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Committee con-

cluded that
The paradox in the situation is that the sanctions are so compelling
that the authorities almost never use them. Because the banks are so
important in an industrial-commercial economy, compulsive steps
which might shake confidence are withheld. Although there is in fact
an iron hand within the 14velvet glove of the banking authorities, the
glove is seldom removed.
A decade or so later the efficacy of this system of paternalistic, associational regulation was celebrated by one of the Committee's researchers
(by then one of the foremost authorities on federal administrative law),
Kenneth Culp Davis, as "superior in its efficiency" and "one of the most
successful" systems of regulation then extant in federal governance.' 5 As
Modernizing The Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive
Banks 1-25-27 (1991)[hereinafter "Modernizing the Financial System"](tracing changes
in the financial marketplace as a contributory factor in increasing the instability of the
banking industry); White, Debacle, supra note 2, 58-61 (describing the conditions in
which thrifts operated during the postwar years of prosperity).
10. See T. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation ch. 4 (1984); Rabin, FederalRegulation
in HistoricalPerspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1236-42 (1986).
11. See Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Monograph of the Attorney General's Comm. on Admin. Procedure, part 9, Federal Reserve System; id. part 13,
Federal Control of Banking: Comptroller of the Cusrency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)[hereinafter Monograph].
12. See Monograph, supra note 11, part 9, at 32; see also id. part 13, at 42-43.
13.
The marked informality of the [Federal Reserve] Board's procedure is readily
explicable. So complete have been the pre-hearing conferences and examinations, and so reluctant has the Board been to proceed, that the hearing and the
ultimate decision is and can be little more than a formal gesture superimposed
upon what everyone, including the respondents, concede is a fait accompli....
The respondent's attitude is significantly reflected in his unconcern as to
whether he is to be heard before the Board, as he may elect, or before a
subordinate, and by his failure to exercise the granted right of arguing before or
submitting briefs to the Board.
Monograph, supra note 11, part 9, at 31.
14. Id. part 13, at 18.
15. 1 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 4.04, 247-48 (1958).
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Professor Davis observed,
[t]he striking fact is that whereas the nonbanking agencies administer
their systems of requiring licenses and approvals by conducting formal
adjudications in most cases involving controversies, the banking agencies use methods of informal supervision, almost always without formal adjudication, even for the determination of controversies. The
contrast is a striking one with respect to each parallel problem; for
instance, the problem of the extent of community need is about the
same whether the application is for establishment of a bank, a television station, or an airline, and yet the problem is handled in the banking field by the methods of the businessman16and in the other fields by
the methods of the judge in his courtroom.
Hence, as the Court noted in the PhiladelphiaNational Bank case in
1962, "recommendations by the agencies concerning banking practices
tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of formal compliance proceedings."'" "To the efficacy of this system," Justice Brennan
went on to remark,
"we may owe, in part, the virtual disappearance of
18
failures."
bank
Professor Davis was referring more directly to the chartering powers
of the banking agencies than to their ensuing enforcement powers, but, as
the observations of the Attorney General's Committee indicate, his comments seem to have been equally applicable to the latter. Because formal
enforcement action was so rarely taken, litigation between the banking
agencies and members of the industry appears largely to have been confined to entry and expansion disputes concerning matters like chartering,
branching and product offerings. When enforcement actions were challenged, the courts accorded the agencies a degree of deference commensurate with the high standing of the agencies, the highly autonomous
nature of banking regulation itself, and the relatively low level of pain
inflicted by the enforcement sanctions.1 9 Even where there was no explicit statutory authority for the agency pressure, the courts remained
tolerant. In 1958, for example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit rejected a
complaint that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") had
placed improper pressure on the directors of an S&L to resign, observing
that "[w]hen a governmental agency holds such great powers over its
offspring, even to the point of appointing a conservator or receiver to
replace the management. . ., it is difficult to hold that an informal request, even demand, to clean house would amount to an abuse of the
16. Id. Professor Davis subsequently modified his views. See Davis, Administrative
Procedurein the Regulation of Banking, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 713 (1966). Perhaps

sensing the portents of things to come, the discussion of banking supervision was dropped
from the second edition of his treatise in 1978.
17. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. at 330.
18. Id.

19. The development of a variety of graduated sanctions really only began in 1966,
and even then these sanctions were quite mild by comparison with those now available to
the banking agencies. See infra, text accompanying notes 59-64.
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statutory powers and discretion of the agency." 2 It was possible for a
banking lawyer to observe as recently as 1988 that "the traditional posture of reviewing courts" and the "traditional result in enforcement
cases," when a banking agency is challenged in court, is that "the agency
wins."'" The courts continue to incant, whenever a banking agency's
enforcement action is challenged, that the agency is entitled to extreme
deference on judicial review.22
B.

Transformation of the Regulatory Landscape

In little more than a decade the environment of banking regulation has
completely changed. When it was a "wonderful life," the regulators possessed "life and death" powers that, precisely because they were so severe, never had to be exercised.2 3 The Fed could seek cancellation of the
rights and privileges of membership, thereby effectively terminating the
existence of a national bank,24 and could expel a member bank from
membership of the Federal Reserve System.25 The Fed and the Comptroller could, in limited circumstances, remove directors and officers of
national and state member banks.2 6 The Comptroller could revoke the
charters of national banks,2 7 and both the Comptroller and the FHLBB
could seize national banks and federal S&Ls, respectively, and place
them in receivership;2" the FHLBB could terminate the membership of

thrifts in the Home Loan Bank System;29 and the FDIC and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") could terminate
federal deposit insurance.30

20. Miami Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 414-15 (5th
Cir. 1958) (quoted recently by Justice White in United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267,
1279 (1991)). The court in Miami Beach acknowledged that the threat of serious sanctions was, "[r]ealistically.... the only pressure a representative of the Board could exert," and that the directors could have refused to comply with the alleged demands.
Miami Beach, 256 F.2d at 415.
21. Huber, Enforcement Powers of FederalBanking Agencies, 7 Ann. Rev. Banking L.
123, 168 (1988).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99. A similar attitude of deference prevailed even with regard to chartering and branching decisions, at least until 1965. See
Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the FederalBanking Agencies, 42
U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 244-49 (1975).
23. For a comprehensive review of the early enforcement powers of the banking agencies, see generally Huber, supra note 21; M. A. Cobb, Federal Regulation of Depository
Institutions: Enforcement Powers and Procedures (1984 & 1989 Cum. Supp. 1989)
[hereinafter Cobb, Enforcement Powers, and Cobb, Supplement]. See also R. Serino, The
Intermediate Administrative Remedies of the Comptroller of the Currency (Rutgers
Univ. thesis 1975).
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 501a (1988).
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 327 (1988).
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 77 (repealed 1966).
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1988).
28. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 1821(c) (1988)(Comptroller); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2) (1988) (FHLBB).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1988).
30. See, eg., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1988)(FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 1730(b) (1988)(FSLIC).
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But as the industry grew more diverse and the degree of voluntary
compliance began to recede, it became evident that these sanctions were
too crude, too blunt, and too slow for efficient regulation; the regulators
needed more refined instruments. 3' In 1966 Congress first responded by
granting the agencies temporary and permanent cease-and-desist powers,
and modified suspension, removal and prohibition powers.32 Even then,
however, an assumption persisted that these powers would only be necessary in the event of a worst-case scenario, and that the role of the federal
regulators in the exercise of their enforcement powers against statechartered institutions was to be properly confined according to the division of powers between state and federal government: "The purpose of
the [federal] enforcement provisions" was "to quickly stop fraudulent
practices, not to affirmatively recover for them."3 3 The power of recov-

ery had been allocated (appropriately, it was assumed) to the relevant
state authorities.'
The need for even more differentiated enforcement powers persisted,
however, and in 1978 Congress further augmented the existing array of
sanctions possessed by the banking agencies. Congress also granted them
the power, then becoming increasingly common among federal agencies,3 5 to impose modest civil money penalties upon industry recalcitrants.36

Even so, this more complex array of sanctions remained

relatively dormant during the Seventies, as the banking agencies continued to rely primarily upon informality, negotiation and moral suasion in
order to secure regulatory compliance.
Then came a series of developments, the combined effects of which,
37
given the prevailing economic context, led to disastrous results.
Among these was the general move toward banking "deregulation," a
program that took many forms from the reduction in product, market
and interest-rate restrictions3 to the provision of substantial degrees of
31. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 21, at 130-31.
32. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966).
33. Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Nev.
1969). The court recognized the power of FSLIC to sue under assignment of rights, but
not independently, for recovery with respect to injuries suffered by an insured association
as result of fraud. See id,
34. Id. See also 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3532, 3538, 3547.
35. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penaltiesby the Federal
AdministrativeAgencies, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1435 (1979); Goldschmidt, An Evaluation of
the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penaltiesas a Sanction by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 2 Rec. & Rep. Admin. Conference U.S. 896.
36. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 [hereinafter Interest Rate Control Act]. The agencies
were limited to the imposition of a maximum amount of $1,000 per day. See id.
37. See generally White, Debacle, supra note 2, chs. 4-7; Symposium, Savings & Loan
Crisi. Lessons and Look Ahead, 2 Stan. L. & Pol. Rev. 12-158 (1990).
38. See Interest Rate Control Act, supra note 36, (partially increasing the ceiling on
federal deposit insurance); the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter DIDMCA](mandating the
phasing out of Regulation Q governing interest rates, generally increasing federal deposit
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regulatory supervisory relief, partly because of efforts to reduce agency
staff and costs,39 and partly in response to the cry for "forbearance."
Forbearance was the concept punted by the S&L industry and sympathetic politicians in order to prevent thrifts, which the industry believed
were merely suffering from the effects of temporary adverse economic
conditions, from being seized by the FHLBB. 4° Another development-

which reduced market discipline at the very time when deregulation presupposed the operation of market forces-was the substantial increase in
the coverage of federal deposit insurance or, in other words, the expansion of the federal safety net." The overall cohesion and internal discipline of the industry eroded rapidly, and the agencies found themselves
increasingly having to rely upon their formal enforcement powers to secure industry compliance both with federal laws and regulations and
with ever-broadening concepts of safety and soundness."2
As S&Ls and banks started to fail at alarming rates, the congressional
committees began to react, and the reaction took a form that has become
all-too-familiar in recent years: the agencies were excoriated for .lax en-

forcement.43 The perception that lax enforcement has been at least

partly to blame for the S&L crisis continued to intensify during the latter

half of the 1980s, 4 with the agencies themselves rapidly revising in an
insurance from $40,000 to $100,000, and permitting banks and S&Ls to offer negotiable
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 [hereinafter Garn-St. Germain] (permitting S&Ls
to offer money market accounts, engage in agricultural and commercial lending, accept
demand deposits from individuals and commercial corporations, make increased amounts
of consumer loans; increasing the amounts of loans that depository institutions could
make to one borrower).
39. See, e.g., Report of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep.
No. 101-54, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1989) (describing the difficulties in federal
hiring, competition to deregulate at state level, and the huge reduction in California of
supervisory and enforcement staff); see also White, Debacle, supra note 2, 88-91 (documenting the dramatic reduction in FHLBB's field force regulatory scrutiny during the
early 1980s); Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator,Overseer, and Partner, 1990 Duke L.J. 967, 976-77 (describing the refusal by the Office of Management and
Budget to cooperate with the efforts of FHLBB chairman Edwin Gray to increase or even
prevent the reduction of the FSLIC's examination staff).
40. On the forbearance programs developed by the FHLBB and partly authorized by
Congress in the Garn-St Germain and Competitive Equality Banking Acts, see E. Kane,
The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did it Happen? 51-57 (1989); Modernizing the Financial
System, supra note 9, at 1-20, 37-38; Mayer, Bank Robbery, supra note 2, at 156; White,
Debacle, supra note 2, 139-42.
41. See supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., Cobb, Supplement, supra note 23, S3-3-S3-4 (describing trends in enforcement during the 1980s).
43. See Comm. on Government Operations Fifty-seventh Report, Federal Response
to Criminal Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Financial Institutions, H.
Rep. No. 98-1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
44. See Comm. on Government Operations Seventy-second Report, Combating
Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation's Financial Institutions: Current Federal
Efforts are Inadequate, H. Rep. 100-1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); General Accounting Office, Troubled Thrifts: Bank Board Use of Enforcement Actions, GAO/
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upwards direction their estimates of the proportion of "insider abuse,"45
thereby helping to sharpen the focus of regulatory reform in large measure upon the need for a dramatic enhancement of agency enforcement
powers.' The United States Attorney General added his own endorsement to this diagnosis and prognosis.'
By the time of the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),4 s legislators were
satisfied that an important factor contributing to the failure to prevent
the epidemic of thrift and bank failures was the inadequate enforcement
powers (and enforcement efforts) of the Federal regulators.49 More than
convinced of the need for a massive increase in the range and scale of the
enforcement powers possessed not only by the banking agencies but also
by the Attorney General, Congress swept aside objections by industry
GGD-89-68BR (1989); Troubled Thrifts: Use of Supervisory Enforcement Actions,
GAO/GGD-89-105BR (1989). Cf N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went
Wrong: A Look at the Causes Behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s, ch. 10
(1988).
45. A term that is used indiscriminately to cover all forms of misdeed, from serious
errors of judgment and regulatory violations to outright fraud and other criminality.
The term "fraud" is bandied about as if the entire thrift industry were pervaded by
fraudulent activity. This has no doubt spurred the nearly-hysterical reaction in Congress,
but it is a gross exaggeration. See J.R. Barth, The Great Savings and Loan Debacle 44
(1991); cf White, Debacle, supra note 2, at 117 ("The bulk of the insolvent thrifts'
problems... did not stem from such fraudulent criminal activities (as those described in
popular accounts of the crisis]. These thrifts largely failed because of an amalgam of
deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business judgments, foolish strategies, excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real estate
markets") (emphasis in original). But cf.Note, Insider Abuse and CriminalMisconduct
in FinancialInstitution." A Crisis?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 222, 225-28 (1989).
46. See Hearings on HR. 1278 Before the CriminalJustice Subcomm. of the House

Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Rosemary Stewart, then
Director of Enforcement, FHLBB) (52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 734 (1989)). As Ms. Stewart noted elsewhere, the regulators, and particularly the FHLBB, had been trying to secure enhanced enforcement powers for some time. See FHLBB, Justice Dept Lawyers
Outline S&L Bill Criminal Provisions at D.C Meeting, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1150
(1989). A number of enforcement bills had been introduced in Congress.
47. See Fraudin the Savings and Loan Association Area: Hearingson S 413 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)

(statement of Dick Thornburgh, United States Attorney General); see also Fraud in
America's Depository Institutions: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-

ing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 55 S.H.R.G. 1130 (1990) (statements of
Richard L. Fogel, Ass't Comptroller General, and Benton E.Cup, Chairman of Banking,
University of Alabama) (offering assessments of role of fraud in depository institutions);
Include $50 Million in S&L Reform Bill, Att'y General Thornburgh Urges Congress, 53
Banking Rep. (BNA) 44 (1989); Hearingson HR. 1278 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement

of Joe Whitley, United States Assistant Attorney General).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
49. See Report of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-54,
Pt. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 464-65 (1989); Report of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, S.Rep. No. 101-19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1989).
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representatives5 ° and conferred upon the federal banking regulators the
most extensive array of administrative sanctions ever possessed by American administrative agencies. 5
Among the most important enforcement enhancements initiated by
FIRREA are the following. FIRREA introduced the generic concept of
an "institution-affiliated party" to cover persons such as directors, officers, employees, agents and "other persons participating in the affairs"
of an institution.5 2 This has greatly extended the potential subjects of
enforcement action, who now expressly include attorneys, appraisers and
accountants."3 Cease-and-desist authority was expanded to include expressly the power of banking agencies to order restitution or reimbursement, indemnification, guaranty against loss, as well as to order
affirmative corrective action. 4 It has also been made easier for agencies
to issue temporary cease-and-desist orders.5 5 Removal, suspension and
prohibition orders are also now easier to obtain 6 and, perhaps more importantly, removal and prohibition orders can be made on an industrywide basis.5 Such orders can now also be made against institution-affiliated parties who have already resigned, been terminated or have relin50. Members and representatives of the banking industry protested that the enhanced
enforcement powers under FIRREA would be so severe as to deter able persons from
accepting positions in banking institutions and to discourage cooperative negotiation between the industry and regulators, thus doing the industry more harm than good. See,
e.g., Hearingson H.R. 1278 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJusticeof the House Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statements of Edward Yingling, Executive
Director of Government Relations for the American Bankers' Association, and John
Villa, banking attorney); see also FHLBB, Justice Dept. Lawyers Outline S&L Bill Criminal Provisions at D.C. Meeting, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1150 (1989). The then FDIC
General Counsel, John Douglas, publicly acknowledged this danger. See S&L Bill's Enforcement Provisions Could Hinder Negotiations, FDIC Attorney Says, 52 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 1060 (1989).
51. See FIRREA, Title IX. For a thorough analysis, see generally Malloy, Nothing to
FearBut FIRREA Itself,50 Ohio St. L.J. 1117 (1989); see also M. Malloy, The Corporate
Law of Banks 101-33, § 3.2.6b (1990 Cum. Supp.) [hereinafter Malloy, 1990 Supp.]; McSpadden & Byrne, FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases
PenaltiesAllowed, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 427 (1989); Villa, Reform Act Builds Regulators'Arsenal,Am. Banker, Oct. 11, 1989 at 5-6, col. 1.
52. FIRREA, §§ 204(f)(6)(u), 901(a)(r), 103 Stat. at 193, 446 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1813(u), 1786(r)).
53. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4). For an analysis, see Kawasaki, Liability of Attorneys, Accountants, Appraisers, and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 Hastings LJ. 249 (1990);
see also infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
54. See FIRREA, §§ 902(a)(1)(C), 902(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 450, 451 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
55. Id. §§ 902(a)(2)(A), 902(b)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 451, 452 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
56. See id. §§ 903(a)(1), 903(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 453, 455 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)(1)). FIRREA no longer requires "substantial" financial loss or "serious prejudice" to be shown. See id.
57. See id. §§ 903(a)(3), (b)(3), 904(a), 904(b), 103 Stat. at 453, 455, 457, 458 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)).
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quished their relationship with the depository institution.58
Most significant of all, the occasions for, and amounts of, civil money
penalties that can be imposed by both the agencies and the courts on
institutions and institution-affiliated parties have been dramatically increased. There are numerous FIRREA provisions governing civil penalties: in the case of agency (as opposed to judicial 9) enforcement
proceedings, three tiers of penalties have been created. The first tier consists of a maximum penalty of $5,000 per day for violations of laws, regulations, written conditions and agreements.' The second tier prescribes
a maximum penalty of $25,000 per day in the case of reckless engagement in unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duties, and
where the violation is part of a pattern of misconduct that causes more
than minimal loss to the institution, or gain to the party.6" The third tier
imposes as much as $1 million per day liability where the institution or
party knowingly or recklessly causes substantial loss or gain through the
violation.6 2 For the first time, final enforcement orders and modifications
of all such orders were required to be published.63
To prove that Congress was serious, the relevant legislative provisions
were accompanied by exhortations from Congress to deploy these new
powers to the maximum extent feasible: speaking in reference to the civil
money penalty powers conferred by FIRREA, the Conferees urged that
they be used without hesitation:
By greatly expanding the scope of misconduct covered by the civil penalty provisions and by making substantial increases to the penalty
amounts, the Conferees intend for the Federal banking agencies to aggressively utilize this new authority, whenever it is justified in law and
by the facts. 64
Nor were the enhanced sanctions contained in Title IX of FIREA
the only aspects of enforcement that Congress addressed. Another factor
that had been identified as aggravating the S&L Crisis was the failure of
the regulators to seize institutions before they became so hopelessly insolvent that their insured deposits were too expensive for the federal insurance funds to cover. "Forbearance"'6 5 was identified as a source of the
problem, and the need for "early intervention" was (and continues to be)
58. See FIRREA, §§ 905(a), 905(b), 103 Stat. at 459, 460 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)); infra note 165. Similar amendments were effected in various related banking

statutes. See Malloy, Nothing to Fear But FIRREA Itself, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 1117, 1151

n.326 (1989).
59. FIRREA § 951 prescribes judicially-imposed civil penalties of as much as S5 mil-

lion for certain violations of provisions in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.

60. See FIRREA, § 907(a), 103 Stat. at 462 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1)).

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 913, 103 Stat. at 483.
64. See, eg., Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1278, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 440 (1989).

65. See supra note 40.
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prescribed as a cure.6 6 To this end, Congress greatly facilitated the early
seizure of depository institutions by the federal regulators through a variety of mechanisms, some direct and others more indirect.
One direct mechanism was an enlargement of the conditions under
which a federal or state financial institution could be seized by the federal
regulators and placed in conservatorship or receivership.67 Simultane-

ously, indirect mechanisms increased the likelihood that the conditions
for seizure would exist. Perhaps most important was the enhancement of
capital standards as a focus of safety and soundness,6" such that institutions that could not comply with the new and more intense capital requirements imposed by FIRREA or the agencies would be in greater
danger of being judged to be unsafe and unsound and would therefore be
more exposed to enforcement action (including seizure). The agencies
added their own indirect mechanisms. For example, the Fed, with possible tacit endorsement by Congress,6 9 attempted to expand the application
66. See, e.g., Report of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
supra note 49, at 298 (identifying "regulatory and statutory accounting gimmicks," which
facilitated the program of forbearance, as a source of the S&L crisis). Early intervention
and prompt corrective action on the part of regulators continues to animate some of the
most significant proposals for banking reform currently on the legislative agenda. See
Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 9, 41 (the basis for the Treasury Department's bill, Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 1505,
which contains Subtitle E and is devoted to Prompt Corrective Action enforcement provisions); S.543 (Riegle Bill requiring prompt corrective action by regulators, and strongly
supported in recent congressional testimony by outside experts); H.R. 6 (House Banking
Committee's bill requiring same); see also General Accounting Office, Deposit Insurance:
A Strategy for Reform (GAO/GGD-91-26 1991) Ch. 3 (recommending earlier and more
forceful intervention by regulators) [hereinafter "Strategy for Reform"]; Three Banking
Experts Strongly Support PromptAction Provisionsin Reigle Bill, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA)
503, 505 (1991)); Bacon, Bruised by the S&L Fiasco, Lawmakers Now Try to Show they
are Born Again Bank Guardians,Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1991, at A26, col. 1.
67. See, e.g., FIRREA, § 204(x), 103 Stat. at 193-94 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813)(definitions of default); id. § 212(a), 103 Stat. at 222-24 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821) (amending Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 11(c)(4)&(5) concerning the
grounds upon which the FDIC can appoint itself as conservator or receiver of a federally
insured state depository institution); id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 282 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464) (amending Home Owners' Loan Act § 5(d)(2) concerning the grounds for
which the Director of OTS can appoint a conservator or receiver for a federal savings
association); id. § 802, 103 Stat. at 442 (amending § 203(a) of the Bank Conservation Act
concerning the grounds of appointment, by the Comptroller, of the FDIC as conservator
of a national bank).
68. See id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 282 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (adding new
§§ 5(s) and 5(t) to the Home Owners' Loan Act, imposing minimum capital standards for
savings associations, providing for the development and enforcement of these standards
by the Director of OTS,and stipulating that the standards should be at least equal to
those imposed on commercial banks).
69. In FIRREA, Congress imposed liability on "commonly-controlled depository institutions" for losses incurred by the FDIC in connection with the default of, or assistance provided to, sister institutions, and granted the FDIC power to assess the amount of
compensation to be paid. Id. § 206(a)(7)(e), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(e)) (adding to the FDI Act § 5(e)). This imposition of cross-liability on affiliate
institutions might perhaps be regarded as implicit recognition of the principle underlying
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of its controversial "source of strength" doctrine.7 0 The doctrine was
first upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate requirement for new
bank holding companies.7 1 The "source of strength" doctrine has been
used by the Fed in its attempt to impose upon bank holding companies

the continuing requirement that they provide financial support for their

ailing bank subsidiaries. Next Term the Supreme Court will resolve the

question of whether this is a legitimate exercise of the Fed's regulatory

powers;72 in the meantime, the doctrine has been deployed as a means of
enhancing the regulators' combined powers over the banking conglomerates, providing7 3 a triggering mechanism for a chain of enforcement-related activity.
The 1989 reforms did not end the matter. Frustrated by the apparent

ineffectiveness of the regulators' newly-enhanced enforcement powers
when dealing with the more artful miscreants-so-called "S&L Kingpins" 7 4 - Congress enacted the Crime Control Act, 7s which deals with,

among other things, the administrative enforcement powers of the federal
banking agencies. Title XXV of the Act is labeled the "Comprehensive
Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of
1990.,,76 This legislation is primarily concerned with increasing the
criminal penalties and disabilities attaching to financial-institution-related crimes and making provision for criminal and civil forfeiture; it
does, however, augment significantly the administrative enforcement
powers of the banking agencies as well.'
In the case of a failing bank, thrift or credit union, the Crime Control
Act permits the FDIC, conservators, the NCUAB and liquidating agents
the Fed's source of strength doctrine, although there is no indication in the legislative
history.
70. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1990) (Regulation Y); Policy Statement, 52 Fed. Reg.
15707 (1987).
71. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439
U.S. 234 (1978).
72. See MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of the Governors Fed. Res. Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 113-17.
74. The "kingpin" rhetoric was embraced by Congress in the Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (to be codified at various sections of 18, 26 and
31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Crime Control Act] which created a new financial crimes enterprise offense. See id. § 2510 ("Financial Crime Kingpin Statute")(to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 225).
75. Crime Control Act, supra note 74.
76. Subtitle H of Title XXV stands independently as the "Financial Institutions AntiFraud Enforcement Act of 1990." For general preliminary analysis, see Buchman &
Douglas, The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank FraudProsecutionand Taxpayer Recovery
Act of 1990, memorandum reprinted in Prentice Hall Law & Business, Current Developments in Banking Litigation 31 (1991) [hereinafter Current Developments]; Villa &
Krasne, A PreliminaryReview of Banking Law Enforcement Provisions Containedin Title
XXV of the Crime ControlAct of 1990, in Current Developments, supra, at 558.
77. For initial critical comment, see, e.g., Atinson, Bankers Worry About Effects of
Crime Bill, Am. Banker, Nov. 20, 1990, at 1; Glancz, Jordan & Metheson, New Bank
FraudLaw May Frighten Off the Competent, Am. Banker, Jan. 29, 1991, at 4.
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to apply to court for an order attaching the assets of any person designated by the respective agency, pending the resolution of the receivership
or conservatorship. 78 The banking agencies are also empowered to seek
prejudgment attachments to prevent the dissipation or removal of assets
final resolution of any unresolved enforcement action involving money
damages, restitution or civil money penalties. 79 The FDIC and NCUAB
are given the power to prohibit or limit, by regulation or order, any
golden parachute payment or indemnification agreement where the
agency believes that: the beneficiary has engaged in fraud, a breach of
trust or fiduciary duty; insider abuse has materially affected the depository institution or holding company, is substantially responsible for causing the institution's insolvency, or has violated various federal or state
banking laws or regulations.8 0 Banking agencies are now required to report their enforcement action publicly on a monthly basis, and are required to include consent agreements as well as final orders.8 1 The
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") also is required to maintain a
special enforcement division to assist and advise the RTC "and other
agencies" in "pursuing cases, civil claims, and administrative enforcement actions" under the RTC's jurisdiction.8 2
It is likely that Congress, either through further legislation or by
means of its oversight activities, will continue to mandate or encourage
vigorous enforcement efforts. In its report to the Congress on the reform
of the federal deposit insurance system, the General Accounting Office
concluded that delays in the institution of formal enforcement proceedings have been partly responsible for the failure of some institutions that
could have been saved,83 and the report urges the adoption of legislation
mandating earlier, more formal intervention by the agencies. 84 This report was followed up by another, based on a study of 72 troubled banks,
in which it is demonstrated that earlier, vigorous enforcement action
might well have saved some of the banks that failed.85 The latter GAO
report also strongly criticizes the Fed, FDIC, and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") in particular, for having actually
reduced the level of their enforcement activities during the period 19861989.86
78. See Crime Control Act, supra note 74, § 2521(a), 104 Stat. at 4863 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d), 1878(b)(2)).
79. See id. § 2521(c)(1), 104 Stat. at 4865 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)).
80. See id. § 2523, 104 Stat. at 4868 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(k), 1786(t)).
81. See id. § 2547, 104 Stat. at 4886 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(u), 1786(s)).
82. Id. § 2540, 104 Stat. at 4884 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)).
83. See GAO, Strategy for Reform, supra note 66.
84. See id. at ch. 3 (proposing the institution of a "tripwire" system, in terms of which
graduated, and progressively more severe, enforcement responses on the part of the responsible supervising agency would be legislatively mandated according to the stages of a
bank's deterioration).
85. See General Accounting Office, Bank Supervision: Prompt and Forceful Regulatory Actions Needed (GAO/GCD-91-69) [hereinafter "Bank Supervision"].
86. Id. at 33-45; see also H.R. 1505 (Treasury-sponsored bill containing numerous
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The banking agencies seem to have got the message and have not hesitated to use their new powers. Enforcement activity has sharply increased, particularly at the

OCC17

and the Office of Thrift Supervision

8

("OTS"); the OTS issued a new capital directive immediately after the
passage of FIRREA 9 and substantially reorganized and strengthened its
enforcement operations;' the agencies have considerably increased the
size of the penalties they have sought against institutions and institutionaffiliated parties;91 under their expanded cease and desist powers, the
new enforcement provisions); S. 543, tit. II (Riegle bill); H.R. 6, tit. I (House Banking

Committee Bill); supra note 66; cf Comm. on Government Operations; The U.S Government's War Against Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in FinancialInstitutions: Winning
Some Battles But Losing the War, H. Rep. 101-982, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (finding

that serious misconduct continues to plague the industry, that the enforcement efforts by
the Justice Department remain inadequate, and recommending, inter alia, that the banking agencies revise their procedures in order to ensure that "bad actors" are more effectively screened out of the industry (Title VIII)).
87. The Comptroller of the Currency has announced the following substantial increases in formal enforcement activities at the OCC:
OCC ENFORCEMENT ACrIONS
Type of Action
Cease & Desist Orders
Removals
Civil Money Penalties
Formal Agreements

r-OR 1989 AND 1990
Total 1989
Total 1990
2
47
14
30
129
151
87
168

AGAINST NATIONAL BANKs

Source: B.A. Rehm, Despite Errors Clarke Says, Confirmation Not in Peril,

Am. Banker, June 11, 1991, at 1.
88. The following figures demonstrate the effect of FIRREA at the OTS:
OTS

ENFORCEMENT

AcTIONs

AGAINST ALL THRIFT INSTITUTIONS FOR

1989 AND 1990

Type of Action
Cease & Desist Orders
Removal, Prohibition & Suspension
Orders

Total 1989
34
47

Total 1990
63
78

Civil Money Penalties
0
26
Formal Agreements
267
347
Source: OTS Office of Congressional Relations & Communications
As the General Accounting Office found, the other agencies slightly reduced their formal enforcement activities during 1986-1989. See GAO, Bank Supervision, supra note
85, at 35. The response of the regulators, however, has been a defensive one, indicating
that they will now take formal action whenever possible. See, eg., idAppendix Il, at 70
(Comments from the OCC, stating that "OCC's 1990 report of enforcement actions...
showed a total of 842 formal and informal enforcement actions initiated in a single year.
...The GAO's report reflects that the OCC takes many more enforcement actions per
regulated bank than either the FDIC or the Federal Reserve Board.")
89. Office of Thrift Supervision, Capital Adequacy: Guidance on the Status of Capital and Accounting Forbearances and Capital Instruments Held by a Deposit Insurance
Fund, Thrift Bulletin No. 38-2 (Jan. 9, 1990) [hereinafter TB 38-2].
90. See OTS FillsKey Enforcement Positions: Shifts Enforcement Personnel, 56 Bank-

ing Rep. (BNA) 357 (Feb. 25, 1991).
91. OTS was seeking the payment of $19.6 million by a former Texas thrift owner
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agencies have begun to seek restitution and reimbursement for losses suffered by financial institutions; 92 under the 1990 Act93 they have successfully secured court orders freezing the assets of directors and officers
pending agency enforcement proceedings; 94 and, in addition to their
criminal referrals to the Justice Department, the FDIC and RTC have
also pursued a number of large civil suits in the courts. 95 The enforcement environment has, in short, radically changed during the past
decade.9 6

II.

RESPONSE OF THE COURTS

As already observed, the courts have tended in the past to display a
under a capital maintenance agreement signed by the former owner before his institution
suffered severe losses. See Klinkerman, Thrift Office, Enforcing CapitalPact,Seeks $19.6
Million in Texas Case, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 1991, at 2. This report also cites former
OTS director of enforcement, Rosemary Stewart, as knowing of "up to five similar
proceedings."
92. See id.

93. See supra text accompanying note 74.
94. See, e.g., N.J. DistrictCourt Freezes Assets, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 528 (Mar. 18,

1991)(reporting that a New Jersey district court had placed restrictions on the assets of
the former president and five officers of Ambase Corp., the holding company for Carteret
Savings Bank of Morristown, New Jersey.); OTS Files Charges Against Ambase Corp.
Officers for Unsafe Thrift Practices, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 367 (Feb. 25, 1991)(discuss-

ing underlying agency proceedings in Ambase case).
95. Perhaps the most publicized examples concern the suits filed against the law firm
of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. The most recent suit is Resolution Trust Corp. v. Keating, Case No. CIV-89-1509 PHX-RMB (MDL Docket No. 834) (D. Ariz. Apr. 4,1991),
in which the firm is being sued for $50 million for having, inter alia, violated its fiduciary
duties and for having concealed and failed to disclose unsafe and unsound practices at
Lincoln Savings & Loan, "effectively prevent[ing] Lincoln from securing counsel to protect its own interests." RTC ChargesJones Day with Assisting Lincoln S&L in Deceiving
Regulators, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 654 (Apr. 8, 1991) (also describing other RTC suits
filed or in preparation). A suit filed earlier against Jones Day by the FDIC seeks $150
million damages for the firm's alleged negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty in representing Texas thrifts. See, e.g., Duke & Marcus, FDICSues Law Firm in Thrift Failures,
Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at B6, col. 5.
For some other recent cases, see FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1387 (Mar. 25, 1991); FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.
1989); FDIC v. Dannen, 747 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Mo. 1990); FDIC v. Bernstein, 1990
W.L. 198738 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); FDIC v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 118 Bankr. 801
(Bkrtcy D.N.M. 1990); see also RTC, Office of InvestigationsProgressReport: September
30, 1990, at 3, reprinted in Current Developments, supra note 76, at 7 (discussing RTC
cases).
96. As a former chairman of the FDIC observed soon after the passage of FIRREA,
"[w]ith respect to supervision, thrifts clearly have some changes in store, and banks are
likely to see a new climate as well. For most of the past decade, supervision and enforcement have grown increasingly formal and adversarial. That trend will likely continue, if
not accelerate." Isaac, Meet the New FDIC,A.B.A. Banking J. 47, 49 (Oct. 1989). For
an indication of the disposition of the agencies themselves, see, e.g., Daily Fine of $1
Million to Banks Making InsiderLoans, FDIC Warns, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 628 (Oct.

30, 1989) (The FDIC Division of Bank Supervision Director has sent letters to state nonmember banks warning them that "examiners will monitor banks closely and will not
hesitate to slap the appropriate penalties on any member bank found violating the
statutes.").
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relatively high degree of deference toward administrative agencies as far
as the choice of sanctions and means of enforcement are concerned. 97
Judge Scalia's dictum in American Trucking Associations, Inc v. Interstate Commerce Commission9 8 isrepresentative of the general disposition
of the courts when reviewing agency enforcement activity:
in designing the most appropriate means to enforce the law, agency
discretion is at its zenith and judicial power at its nadir.99
And this deferential approach was applicable in the context of banking
agency enforcement," °° as, indeed, the agencies themselves were well
aware. 101

Yet the doctrine of deference is not inscribed in stone: it reflects an

attitude rather than a principle of law. Indeed, one of the cases most
frequently cited in support of far-reaching, "hard look" judicial review,
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,10 2 is itself a case involving
the selection, by an agency, from among various options of a particular
sanction, which selection was held by the Court to constitute an improvident exercise of the agency's discretion. The agency, said Justice White,
should have disclosed the basis of its order, given a clear indication that
it had exercised the discretion entrusted to it by Congress, it should have
made findings supporting the decision, including findings "specifically directed to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly
different consequences," and it should have articulated "a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." ' 3 Burlington
Truck Lines and other cases"° have explicitly or implicitly recognized
97. See generally W. Gellhorn, C. Byse, P. Strauss, T. Rakoff & R. Schotland, Administrative Law: Cases and Comments 503-12 (8th ed. 1986) [hereinafter Administrative Law]. As the authors point out, however, the actions of the courts when reviewing
agency enforcement action are unlikely to comport with the lore of deference: the courts,
growing more familiar with reviewing the more structured sentencing process mandated
by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, are likely to develop a more structured approach to
the review of agency enforcement actions. See id at 503-04. In addition, excessive severity (and possibly even excessive gentleness) in the imposition of sanctions is quite likely to
"fuel court intervention." Id at 508-11.
98. 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 1153 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm., 379
F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967) in which Judge Leventhal observed that "the breadth of
agency discretion is, if anything, at its zenith when the action assailed relates primarily
not to the issue of ascertaining whether conduct violates that statute, or regulations, but
rather to the fashioning of policies, remedies and sanctions, including enforcement and
voluntary compliance programs in order to arrive at maximum effectuation of Congressional objectives."). Cf Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186-89
(1973).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
101. See, eg., In the matter of ***and ***, as the Board of Directors of*** (Insured

State Nonmember Bank), FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 5014, at A-158
(1983) (P-H).
102. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
103. Id at 168.
104. See, eg., Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 613-614
(1946) (remanding cease and desist proceedings with instructions to the Commission to
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that, even at the enforcement end of agency action, an agency's discretion is subject to judicial review according to the normal principles of
administrative law relating to abuse of discretion.
In fact, the courts have frequently displayed an inclination to apply
abuse-of-discretion standards to the enforcement actions of the federal
banking agencies. This can be observed across the full spectrum of enforcement and enforcement-related activity. I will focus on what seem to

me the four most important areas: first, and most generally, judicial review of agency selection and application of individualized sanctions; second, judicial review of agency enforcement of regulatory capital
standards; third, judicial review of the discretionary seizure, by the banking agencies, of depository institutions; and, fourth, judicial treatment of
potential tort liability on the part of the agencies for both the seizure and

operation of institutions.
A. JudicialReview of Agency Selection and Application of

Individualized Sanctions
Consonant with the low level of formal enforcement activity on the
part of the agencies themselves, few cases involving judicial review of
such activity were reported during the two decades that preceded the
development of the savings and loan and banking crises. With one frequently-cited exception,10 5 those decisions that were reported also tended
to provide powerful precedents in favor of deference toward the
agencies.'o6
From about 1980, however, there has been a steady (and over the past
two years, a sharp) increase in the number of reported decisions. 107
consider whether less drastic action would be sufficient); Administrative Law, supra note
93, at 507-11.
105. See Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1973). The court reversed an
order by the Comptroller prohibiting stockholder from further participation in the affairs
of a bank for clear departure from statutory authority.
106. See, eg., Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895
(5th Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Dept. of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir.
1978); Mid America Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 523 F.
Supp. 568, 577 (D. Minn. 1980). Cf First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d
1258, 1259 (5th Cir. 1980) (informal letter directives of Comptroller upheld as a "valid
exercise" of latter's wide discretion); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613
F. 2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Comptroller's rulemaking powers can be used in place
of cease-and-desist powers to prevent unsafe and unsound conduct); Continental Bank
and Trust Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214, 216-19 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Fed's order to state bank
to increase its capitalization held not to be final, reviewable agency action); Miami Beach
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (FHLBB can use
threat of more serious sanctions in order to pressure directors to resign).
107. See Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); Northwest Nat'l Bank
v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1990); Kronholm v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1171 (8th
Cir. 1990); Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1990); Central Nat'l Bank of
Mattoon v. United States, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1990); First Nat'l Bank of Gordon v.
Department of the Treasury, 911 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972
(4th Cir. 1990); MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 U.S. 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991); Bullion v. FDIC, 881 F.2d
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Again, this seems obviously to correlate with the increasing frequency of
formal agency action. Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that
the deference so often said to be accorded the agencies by the courts is
much more
selectively observed in practice than the rhetoric would
08
suggest.1
1. The Predicate for Enforcement Action
The courts have usually respected the judgment, by a banking agency,
that the object of its enforcement action has committed a violation of a
law or regulation or, especially, that it has engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice. In the case of violations of law or regulation, the courts
have applied the principle of Chevron deference, in terms of which the
reasonable interpretation by an agency of an ambiguous statute must be
upheld by the reviewing court if the statute is one for which the agency
has primary administrative responsibility." 9 This form of deference existed in the arena of banking enforcement well before the Chevron case
itself was decided in 1984.1 °
In the case of unsafe and unsound practices, and where these practices
are not expressly identified in legislation, the courts have always recognized that the concept of safety and soundness is a highly flexible one
best suited to expert discernment by the agency in the light of the circumstances giving rise to the enforcement proceedings.'
So the basic
1368 (5th Cir. 1989); Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 879 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1989); Currie State Bank v. FDIC, 878 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1989); Stoddard v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Anaya v. FHLBB,
839 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1988); Abercrombie v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
833 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1987); Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244
(7th Cir. 1986); Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580 (1 lth Cir. 1986); Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 765 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir.
1984); Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984); Citizens State Bank of
Marshfield, Missouri v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983); del Junco v. Conover, 682
F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1981); Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981); Bank St.
Croix v. FDIC, 755 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1991); Spiegel v. Ryan, 59 U.S.L.W. 2134
(C.D. Ca. 1990); [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1985); [Anonymous]
v. FDIC, 617 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1985); Somerfield v. FDIC, 609 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985); First Nat'l Bank of Scotia v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 162 (D.D.C. Cir.
1982).
108. Cf Malloy, 1990 Supp., supra note 51, § 3.3.2, at 141-49 (discussing the "mixed"
results "[d]espite the generally wide judicial deference accorded the regulators in enforcement actions").
109. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
110. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 100-02. For subsequent cases expressly
applying Chevron, see Abercrombie, 920 F.2d at 1357; First NationalBank of Gordon, 911
F.2d at 64; Saratoga Sav. & Loan, 879 F.2d at 691; Anaya, 839 F.2d at 1351.
111. See, e.g., Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d
1127, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Whether a financial institution is in an unsafe or unsound condition is largely a predictive judgment (i.e., what may happen if this practice
continues), and reviewing courts should be particularly deferential when they are reviewing an agency's predictive judgments, especially those within the agency's field of discre-
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question as to whether there ought to be liability for some kind of sanction has generally been entrusted to the final judgment of the agency
concerned. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that, at least in the
past, formal enforcement action has always followed only after a fairly
lengthy series of informal interactions between the agency and the depository institution or institution-related party: it is unlikely that the object
of enforcement will have been unaware of the fact that the activity forming the predicate for enforcement action was disapproved by the agency.
Yet even with the safety and soundness concerns underlying the decision to impose sanctions, there have been exceptions. Two major rebuffs
to the banking agencies provide illustrations; both deal with attempts by
the agencies to enforce the strengthening and maintenance of capital
levels at ailing institutions, and both occurred in the Fifth Circuit.
The first case was FirstNationalBank of Bellaire v. Comptrollerof the
Currency.112 The Comptroller had issued a complex cease-and-desist order requiring, among other things, the bank to raise its equity capital to 13a
certain level within 180 days and to maintain that level thereafter.'
Although the court upheld the Comptroller's findings and orders with
respect to most of the other violations, 4 it ruled that the Comptroller's
finding that the banks' existing capital level was unsafe and unsound was
not supported by substantial evidence, even though the court fully recognized that it should defer to the reasonable conclusions of the Comptroller. In the court's view, there was no rational connection between the
existing capital level being maintained by the bank and the Comptroller's
conclusion that this constituted an unsafe and unsound practice." 5 The
Bellaire decision was effectively overruled by Congress soon afterwards
when Congress conferred on the regulators the express power to set general and specific capital requirements and to treat as inadequate the failure to maintain adequate capital levels as an unsafe and unsound
tion and expertise"); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697
F.2d 674, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258,
1265 (5th Cir. 1980); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164,
1168-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller
of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
The courts have also recognized that "unsafe and unsound," in the banking context, is
a concept that is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245, 250 (1947) (this and other concepts are "regulatory. They do not deal with unprecedented economic problems of varied industries. They deal with a single type of enterprise
and with the problems of insecurity and mismanagement which are as old as banking
enterprise."); Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Iowa 1988) (reliance
on such terms is not tantamount to proceeding without standards or acting upon the basis
of "secret law"). Whether the assumptions upon which these decisions are based are still
valid will be considered later. See infra text accompanying notes 207-12.
112. 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 679 n.3.
114. See id. 681-83, 687. The court also ruled against the Comptroller with respect to
an alleged violation, concerning one of the bank's borrowers, of the loans-to-one-person
lending limit contained in 12 U.S.C. § 84. See id. at 683-84.
115. See id. at 684-87.
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practice.' 16
The second rebuff, also in the Fifth Circuit, came in the well-publicized MCorp case," 7 in which the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that the
Fed had no authority to treat the failure by a holding company to provide financial support to its banking subsidiaries as an unsafe and unsound banking practice justifying the imposition of sanctions."' In fact,
the panel went so far as to rule that the Fed's long-standing "source of
strength doctrine""' 9 constituted a "clear departure from statutory authority" and the action of the Board was therefore not subject to the
protection of the statutory preclusionary clause preventing judicial review.1" The final outcome of this case awaits determination by the
Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari to this specific question. 1 '
MCorp and Bellaire are not the only examples, however, of judicial
intervention to strike down the determination by a banking agency that
the predicate for enforcement action has occurred. 122
2.

The Selection of a Sanction

When it comes to the selection by the agency of the kind of sanction or
enforcement action to be applied, the courts have proved to be even less
reticent. In this context, too, the courts have often recognized that agencies are entitled to great deference in the exercise of discretion in shaping
116. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97
Stat. 1280, 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1983); see also infra note 134.
117. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 11 S. CL 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991).
118. See id at 859-62.
119. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 69-73. According to one report, the
source of strength doctrine "had been part of the Fed's regulatory arsenal for more than
30 years." Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Review a Fed Policy on Banks,N.Y.Tunes,
Mar. 15, 1991.
120. See MCorp, 900 F.2d at 857 (applying the exception recognized by the Supreme
Court in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)). The preclusionary clause in question is
contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i).
121. For a review of some of the conflicting policy concerns raised by the source-ofstrength doctrine in the MCorp context, see Vartanian, When Subsidiaries Stumble Parents Face Tough Choices, Am. Banker, Sep. 12, 1990.
122. See, e.g.,
Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 879 F.2d 689, 695-96 (9th Cir.
1989) (Board's cease & desist order reversed because Board's regulation governing acquisition, development and construction loans did not apply to acquisition and development
loans); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 683-84
(5th Cir. 1983) (Comptroller had incorrectly concluded that the object of a cease and
desist order was not protected by a statutory exception); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Jefferson Parish v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,458 U.S.
1121 (1982) (FHLBB could not treat the S&L's method of charging interest, which deviated from its advertised rate but which conformed to accepted practice, as an unsafe or
unsound practice violating consumer interests and serving as a basis for enforcement action against the S&L); Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973) (Comptroller could
not use fact that M had pled guilty to a charge of making a false statement to the Small
Business Administration as the basis for prohibiting M from further participation in the
conduct of the affairs of a bank).
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an appropriate remedy, 1 23 but this has not rendered judicial review a

futile exercise for those who have had enforcement orders entered against
them. On the contrary, there are numerous examples where litigants
have been successful in securing rulings to the effect that particular sanctions applied by the agencies were either not permitted by statute or were
inappropriate or disproportionate in view of the underlying violations.
a. Sanctions Unauthorized by Statute
In the first place, the courts have usually adopted a strict approach to
the question of whether the actual sanction or remedy selected by the

agency has a statutory basis at all. An example is Otero Savings and

Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board.124 The FHLBB

had correctly determined that Otero had been offering automatic transfer
system ("ATS") and negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW") accounts

in violation of the statutory prohibitions then in force. Because the accounts had become legal by the time the Board had determined the violation, the Board decided to impose an "equitable" order, in terms of

which Otero was prevented from opening any new such accounts for a
period of 268 days following the effective date of the order. This remedy
was designed to redress the fact that Otero had gained a 268 day compet-

itive advantage over other institutions by offering such accounts before
being permitted to do so. Although the Tenth Circuit panel agreed that
the accounts had been prohibited,' 2 5 a majority of the panel refused to

defer to the Board regarding the "equitable"
sanction, finding that the
2 6

Board lacked such remedial powers.'
More recently, and prior to the general extension by FIRREA of the
123.
[E]ven if we were inclined to agree that the Comptroller was being excessively
severe. . ., we would not be justified in setting aside his order. The general
posture of a court reviewing agency decisions is deferential; how deferential depends among other things on the nature of the issue. The more open-ended it is,
and hence judgmental, and the more a sound exercise of judgment requires a
specialized knowledge possibly possessed by the agency but certainly not by the
court, the lighter the judicial hand. Here... the choice of sanctions is judgmental-an exercise of administrative discretion entitled to judicial respect
•.. - and depends on particulars of the banking industry to which the generalist federal judiciary is not privy.
Central Nat'l Bank of Mattoon v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 904
(7th Cir. 1990)(Posner J.); see also Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198, 1203 (8th Cir. 1984)
("'Administrative agencies have considerable latitude to shape their remedies within the
scope of their statutory authority.' Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
640 F.2d 1322, 1326 ....
The relation of remedy to statutory policy is peculiarly a
matter for the special competence of the administrative agency. See American Power Co.
v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90... (1946). Thus, an agency's choice of remedies is generally not to
be overturned unless the reviewing court finds that it is unwarranted in law or without
justification in fact." (citations omitted).
124. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).
125. See id. at 281-83.
126. See id. at 286-89, 291-92. The dissent argued that the court should defer to the
Board. See id. at 293.
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agencies' enforcement powers, panels in the Seventh, Eighth and District
of Columbia Circuits refused to defer to the Comptroller, the FDIC and
the Fed, respectively, where these agencies had attempted to adapt their
cease and desist powers to give effect to "equitable"-type reimbursement
orders127 or to extend sanctions to individuals who had already resigned
their positions in the depository institutions concerned.1 28 The confusion
resulting from these decisions, which stood in contrast to those of other
courts and which highlighted the inconsistencies between the enforcement powers of the various agencies, 2 9 was addressed by Congress in
FIRREA, which expressly granted to the agencies the powers they had
claimed in the earlier litigation, 130 but it would be sanguine to assume
that disputes concerning the validity of these powers are completely
over."' In any event, even with their extended statutory authority, the
agencies have still to pass muster under the rationality review, to which
we now turn.
b. Inappropriateor DisproportionateSanctions
Even where it is clear that the particular kind of sanction imposed by
the agency was one within the bounds of the agency's general discretion127. See, eg., Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1255-56 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Comptroller had no authority under his cease and desist powers to require
directors personally to compensate bank for losses caused by approval of excessive loans);
Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 216-219 (8th Cir. 1984) (FDIC lacked power
to order reimbursement to consumers by bank for overcharges arising from technical
Truth in Lending violations).
128. See Stoddard v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 868 F.2d 1308, 1310-12
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Board lacked jurisdiction to order removal of Stoddard from directorship and office, or to impose further prohibitions upon him, because Stoddard had already resigned his positions before the removal proceedings had been instituted).
129. Other circuits and panels had affirmed similar claims by other banking agencies.
See Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1990); Anaya v. FHLBB, 839
F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987); Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580, 1581-84
(11th Cir. 1986); del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1146 (1983); First Natl Bank v. Dept. of Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir.
1978).
130. See FIRREA, §§ 902, 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b),
1786(e)). FIRREA grants to the agencies express authority to include orders of restitution and reimbursement as part of cease and desist orders. Id. § 905, 103 Stat. at 459 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(i), 1786(k))(thereby permitting removal and prohibition
orders to be made, for a period of six years, against persons who have already severed
their connection with the depository institutions in question). For commentary, see Report of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 49, at 467-68
(discussing the Larimore decision); Id. at 468-69 (discussing the Stoddard decision).
131. In Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984), the court expressed
misgivings about the constitutional validity under Article III of any statutory authorization to the agency which might permit it to order that the bank reimburse consumers for
overcharges. Id. at 219. Because the banking industry is so closely regulated, however,
and because there remains the protection of judicial review, it is likely that the power of
the banking agencies, as part of an enforcement action, to adjudicate liability between
institutions and their affiliated parties would not violate Article III. See Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834 (1986).
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ary powers, the courts have not always accepted that the sanctions were
appropriately applied to the cases at hand. In some proceedings, for example, courts have remanded the proceedings to the agencies after engaging in the most exacting, "hard look" review in ways that have been fully
consistent with the most rigorous
standards of review applicable else132
where in administrative law.

There have also been rulings declaring the scope of the remedy inappropriately broad, given the inadequacy of the agency's explanation or

underlying findings, 133 or because of the temporary nature of the pro-

ceedings.' 34 And even though the courts have been willing to accept the
imposition of fairly severe sanctions,1 35 they have sometimes found civil
penalties to be improperly determined
because of a failure to take into
36
account all relevant considerations.'
B.

JudicialReview of Agency Enforcement of
Regulatory CapitalStandards

The courts have even been remarkably interventionist, though so far
only at the district court level, in one highly controversial area of enforcement activity: namely, the enforcement by the OTS of the new capital maintenance and accounting standards imposed by Congress in
132. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971); see, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8th Cir. 1983)
(articulating hard look review and citing the standard precedents for such review, Motor
Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 31 (1983); see also
First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 680-81 (5th
Cir. 1983) (using similar, hard look language); [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 617 F. Supp. 509,
514 (D.D.C. 1985) (also citing State Farm for principles of judicial review of discretionary agency action).
133. See, eg., [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 866 (D.D.C. 1985) (preliminary injunction granted; inadequate justification supplied by the agency for imposing an
industrywide prohibition or suspension from current employment).
134. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Ryan, 59 U.S.L.W. 2134, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 306 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (temporary cease & desist power an inappropriate vehicle for making an order
requiring correction of past actions). The Crime Control Act of 1990, § 2596(b), overruled the effects of this decision by permitting the banking agencies to include orders for
affirmative relief within the scope of temporary cease and desist orders. For an example
of a case, in which the exercise of the new temporary cease and desist powers have been
upheld, see Bank St. Croix v. FDIC, 755 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1991).
135. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1352 (7th Cir. 1990)(assessment
of moderately severe penalties affirmed); Central Nat'l Bank v. United States Dept. of the
Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 903-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (Comptroller's revocation of bank's trust
powers, though severe, held not to be disproportionate to wrong committed).
136. See, e.g., Bullion v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 1368, 1370 (5th Cir. 1989) (partial reversal
and remand for redetermination of penalty assessed against one party because of failure
by agency to take into account party's ability to pay). Cf Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972,
973 (4th Cir. 1990) (remand to trial court for reassessment of agency's imposition of civil
penalties because of possible failure by trial court to appreciate that Change in Bank
Control Act, under which the penalties were assessed, requires de novo review by trial
court).
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FIRREA on S&Ls.13 7 Because the cases involved have generated a jurisprudence and controversy of their own, they will be treated as a separate
issue in this paper. But a connection between them and the cases already
discussed should not be overlooked. To the extent that the agencies are
expressly authorized to take enforcement action against, including even
seizure of, an institution by reason of its failure to maintain required capital standards, 3 ' the power to impose such standards by the Director of
OTS (DOTS)-even in the face of agreements to the contrary between
the OTS's predecessor and the thrift concerned--constitutes an extremely far-reaching weapon in the regulator's bag of supervisory
instruments.
Disputes concerning the exercise of this power have revolved around
four main issues. First, has Congress effected a taking by requiring those
thrifts that had secured forbearance agreements to write down their regulatory goodwill over a period shorter than that provided for in the agreements? If so, it might follow that, while the DOTS is authorized to
enforce the write down, the United States would be liable for compensation under the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, the FDIC might
be liable to make restitution to the investors of the seized institution for
the amount by which the institution's value had been enhanced as a result of their contributions made in reliance on a forbearance agreement.13 9 Second, and in the alternative, did Congress intend to preserve
the rights of those thrifts that had secured forbearance agreements, such
that the OTS, as successor to the FHLBB, is contractually bound by the
agreements? Third, if breaches of the agreements by the agency have
taken place, can declaratory and injunctive relief be secured in the federal
district courts, or does the principle of sovereign immunity require that a
suit for damages be brought in the United States Claims Court? Finally,
can the refusal by the DOTS to grant a discretionary exemption from the
application of the capital standards be subjected to ordinary APA-type
judicial review for abuse of discretion?
In addressing these issues in various procedural formats, the decisions
137. See generally, Note, Abrogation of ForbearanceAgreements
FIRREA and Unconstitutional,59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 157 (1990).

Unauthorized by

138. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(s)(3), (t)(6)(E), (t)(7)(E) (1988) (providing that failure to
maintain adequate capital may be treated by the DOTS as an unsafe and unsound practice); id. § 3907(b)(1) (International Lending Supervision Act of 1983). The connection
between capital standards and enforcement is underlined by the fact that this provision of
the International Lending Supervision Act was enacted in response to the decision in
First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983),
which had struck down that portion of the Comptroller's cease and desist order that had
required the bank to maintain a specific level of capital as being unsupported by substantial evidence. The Act expressly permitted the agencies to treat the failure to maintain
adequate capital standards as an unsafe and unsound practice. See Cobb, Supplement,
supra note 23, S2-23-S2-25; Huber, supra note 21, at 147-48.
139. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(affirming jurisdiction of district court to consider claim for restitution as a cause of action independent from a takings claim).
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at the district court level have gone in every direction and (perhaps in
reaction against perceived regulatory overkill 14°) usually against the
OTS. One court has dismissed a thrift's takings and estoppel claims because it found no waiver of sovereign immunity, 4 ' but other courts have

granted preliminary relief either because they have found the rights created by the forbearance agreements to have been protected by FIRREA

itself, or because the DOTS' implementation of the capital standards
under FIRREA has been inflexible and therefore unreasonable. 142 After
a full trial, another court concluded that FIRREA did not abrogate a
conversion and forbearance agreement entered into between the FHLBB
and an ailing thrift, and that the repudiation by DOTS of the conversion

agreement constituted an unconstitutional taking.1 43 The Claims Court

has found in one case that the government intended to enter into a binding contract, but the question of liability is still pending. 144
145
On the other hand, the circuits that have ruled so far on the merits

have both found in favor of the government, although not without entirely eliminating the confusion surrounding the disputes.1 4 6 First, 147
in
FranklinFederalSavings Bank v. Director,Office of Thrift Supervision,
the Sixth Circuit (in a 2-1 decision) concluded that Congress did intend
in FIRREA to abrogate the forbearance agreements,1 48 that the DOTS is
140. Cf Wayne, Bank Regulators: Too Much Zeal?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at C2,
col. 1.
141. Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 1990 WL 134841
(D.D.C. 1990). But the court held that it had jurisdiction over the thrift's administrative
law claims. Id. at * 10.
142. See Carteret Say. Bank v. OTS, 762 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1991); Hansen Say.
Bank v. OTS, 758 F. Supp. 240 (D.N.J. 1991). Rodriguez J. noted that "[iun this case,
there is no evidence of mismanagement. [Hansen Savings) did not receive gratuitous
forbearances. Plaintiffs contributed substantial assets and agreed to absorb a failing
thrift's losses in order to help relieve the government of its insurance obligation." Id. at
247.
143. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Or.
1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint, seeking rescission of the forbearance agreement and restitution for the amount by which the
FSLIC Resolution Fund was enriched as a result of the agreement, was not tried because
the Federal Circuit had granted a stay pending determination of whether, on this issue,
the district court had jurisdiction instead of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit has
now affirmed the jurisdiction of the district court and dissolved the stay. See id.
144. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (U.S. C!. Ct. 1990). The
Claims Court has recently rejected the takings claim by American Continental Corporation with respect to the seizure of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, but this case
did not involve the regulatory capital and forbearance issues. See American Continental
Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Far West Fed. Bank. v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (affirming jurisdiction of district court to determine claim seeking rescission of
forbearance agreement and restitution from relevant government fund); First Fed. Say.
Bank v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining to reach the merits and holding
that OTS had not yet taken final action that would be ripe for review).
146. Other appeals are still pending. See 3(7) Bank/Thrift Lit. & Enf. News 4-5 (2/
18/91).
147. 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1991).
148. See id. at 1334, 1337.
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authorized to disregard the limitations contained in the forbearance
agreements, but that this would constitute a taking for which compensation would have to be paid. 4 9
The Eleventh Circuit has also ruled in favor of the OTS,reversing the
decision of the district court in Guaranty FinancialServices to grant a
preliminary injunction against the OTS.'1 The district court had found
there was substantial likelihood on the merits of the plaintiff's claim that
it had a binding agreement with the OTS concerning supervisory goodwill, and that the rights, duties and obligations thereunder had been protected by FIRREA.' 5 1 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, while
accepting that the agreement between the FHLBB and the thrift constituted a contract, construed the contract as a conditional one. The agreement had defined regulatory capital and regulatory capital requirements
in accordance with federal regulations including "any successor regulation," and the agreement explicitly recognized that all regulations to
which it referred might be amended." 2 The Court ruled that the contract therefore anticipated changes, including the tightening of capital
requirements.' 5 3 In reaching this result, the court applied a well-established canon of construction in terms of which "one who wishes to obtain
a contractual right against the sovereign that is immune from the effect
of future changes in law must make sure that the contract confers such a
right in unmistakable terms.""
Having concluded that the agreement between Guaranty Financial
and the FHLBB did indeed reserve to the Congress and the agencies the
right to change the regulatory standards,' the court went on to consider
whether Congress, in FIRREA, had intended to preserve Guaranty Financial's existing rights under the agreement. Like the Sixth Circuit,'5 6
the Eleventh Circuit concluded, after an extensive review of the legislative history, that Congress did indeed intend to abrogate the regulatory
capital standards contained in agreements such as the one entered into
between Guaranty Financial and the FHLBB.'5 7 Hence Guaranty Financial's rights under the contract had changed as a result of FIRREA.
149. Id. at 1341.

150. Guaranty Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991), reversing 742 F.
Supp. 1159 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
151. See id. at 995.

152. Id. at 999.
153. Id.

154. Id. at 1001 (quoting Western Fuels-Utah v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990)). The court also emphasized the Supreme Court's admonition, as expressed in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), "that contracts should be construed, if possible, to avoid
foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority." Id. at 52-53.
155. The agency could hardly have contracted to prevent Congress from exercising the
power to change the regulatory system: at most, this exercise of Congress' police power
might give rise to a claim for compensation under the Takings Clause.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
157. GuarantyFinancial,928 F.2d at 994.
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The court's approach in Guaranty Financialwould not entirely eliminate the possibility of a successful claim against the government where
the terms of the agreement were sufficiently clear. Turning as it does on
the specific terms of the contract itself, GuarantyFinancialdoes not settle the question of whether agreements that did not contemplate a change
in the specific capital requirements of the thrift concerned should be regarded as binding, FIRREA notwithstanding. But the conclusion of
both the Sixth and Eleventh circuits that Congress clearly intended to
abrogate the capital forbearances contained in the agreements entered
into between the FHLBB and thrifts prior to the enactment of FIRREA
suggests that the disputes concerning those thrifts which can establish
clear and binding agreements will now turn into disputes concerning just
compensation, and that injunctive relief from the courts, at least where
this interpretation of FIRREA is followed, is likely to be foreclosed.
Because of the uncertainty as to whether the Sixth and Eleventh circuits' interpretation is correct, a most important decision is pending appeal in Far West Federalin the Ninth Circuit. The district court, after a
full bench trial, had granted injunctive and declaratory relief on the basis
that a conversion agreement between the FHLBB and the plaintiff was
binding on the government, that the agreement had not been abrogated
by FIRREA, and that the repudiation of the agreement by the OTS constituted an unconstitutional taking.15 8
Although the OTS is claiming victory in the wake of its successes in
the FranklinFederaland GuarantyFinancialcases, the claim seems premature given the variety of views, both in the circuit panels and in the
district courts, and given the unresolved takings issue. It seems inevitable that the dispute will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
C. JudicialReview of DiscretionarySeizures
The most drastic action a banking agency can take is to seize the institution and place it in conservatorship or receivership. This is not only
the most far-reaching enforcement power possessed by the agencies, it is
also the one which the courts have long been most loath to burden with
due process requirements beyond those provided for by Congress."5 9 It
is, moreover, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish that the
158. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1042 (D. Or.
1990). The district court denied an OTS motion to sever one of the counts and transfer it
to the U.S. Claims Court. The Federal Circuit granted a temporary stay pending appeal
but on appeal then affirmed the district court and lifted the stay. See Far West Fed. Bank
v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
159. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Haralson v. FHLBB, 655 F. Supp. 1550
(D.D.C. 1987); Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W. 2d 734 (Iowa 1988). Cf. FDIC
v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (need for prompt governmental action also justifies summary removal of director from office long prior to full administrative hearing and final
determination on merits. The Mallen case involved the same parties as those in Farmers
State Bank, supra).
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seizure would constitute a taking for the purpose of the Just Compensation Clause. 1" Furthermore, even though Congress may have implied a
broader standard when it directed district courts to determine "upon the
merits" whether the appointment was sustainable,1 61 many courts have
indicated that they will apply the normal arbitrary-and-capricious standard when reviewing challenges to the appointment of conservators or
receivers."
Finally, the courts have refused to grant injunctive relief to
ward off the regulators before seizure takes place; instead, the statutory
remedy of post-seizure challenge has been held to be exclusive. 63
In 1990, the OTS won a major victory when the seizure of Lincoln
Savings and Loan by its predecessor, the FHLBB, went to trial before
Judge Stanley Sporkin in the District Court of the District of Columbia.' Many of the facts surrounding Lincoln are well known: Charles
Keating, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lincoln's holding
company, American Continental Corporation ("ACC"), was a focal figure in the inquiry into the ethical conduct of the "Keating Five" senators, that led to a recommendation for the censure of Senator Alan

Cranston.
The FHLBB placed Lincoln in conservatorship in April 1989, and the
following August, the Board converted the conservatorship into a receivership. The Board determined that Lincoln was "in an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business" and that there had been a
substantial dissipation of Lincoln's assets as a result of regulatory violations and unsafe and unsound practices.' 65 Among the numerous reasons for the Board's action were certain arrangements between ACC and
Lincoln, including a "tax sharing agreement," under the terms of which
160. See American Continental Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (national banks); id. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (formerly
1464(d)(6)(A), S&Ls); id. § 1821(c)(7) (state insured banks; appointment by FDIC).
162. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127,
1141-42 (10th Cir. 1991); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-09 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d
1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1986); Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 904-05
(D.D.C. 1990); San Marino Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. 502, 508 (C.D.
Ca. 1984); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343, 350, 35354 (N.D. Ohio 1981). But cf. Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 742 F. Supp.
1089, 1095-99 (D. Kan. 1990) (indicating that a somewhat wide, "hybrid," scope of review than that contemplated by the APA-type "arbitrary and capricious" review is contemplated), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); Haralson v. FHLBB, 655 F. Supp.
1550, 1557-60 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1149-52
(N.D. Ill. 1986)(same); Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 869-70
(N.D. MI1.1981) (same), aff'd on other grounds,703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 992 (1983); Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (N.D.
Ca. 1982) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 914 (1983).
163. See American Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991); Shemoasky v. OTS,
733 F. Supp. 892, 895 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
164. Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
165. See Lincoln Savings, 743 F. Supp. at 903 (quoting the statutory grounds for appointment of a conservator or receiver).
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Lincoln was required to remit to ACC the amounts of tax it would ostensibly owe on the basis of its net profits. ACC would then merge this tax

liability with its own, on a consolidated basis, and, because ACC had
large stored-up operating losses, ACC was able keep the amounts received from Lincoln. In other words, the arrangement created a means
whereby ACC was able to "upstream" $94 million from Lincoln, thereby
dissipating Lincoln's assets to the detriment of Lincoln's own safety and
soundness and, of course, at great cost to the federal deposit insurance
66
fund.

1

Judge Sporkin found the upstreaming agreement and many other practices fully proved by the FHLBB's successor, the OTS, and he found that
they amply justified the Board's seizure of Lincoln. The regulator's action survived scrutiny not only under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard that Judge Sporkin determined was applicable to reviews of thrift
seizures, but also under "each of the other standards that are utilized to
review an agency action."' 6 7 In addition to excoriating ACC, Lincoln,
and its directors and officers, Judge Sporkin also added a special postscript in which he raised concerns about the conduct of the lawyers and
accountants, particularly with regard to their failure to disassociate

themselves from the obviously improper transactions between ACC, Lincoln, and others. Moreover, he seemed to provide strong encouragement

to the bank regulators to intensify their enforcement action against "institution-affiliated" professionals. 61 Certainly, this is how his observations were received by the regulators, particularly the OTS, 169 which had
166. See id. at 908-911.
167. Id. at 905. Presumably Judge Sporkin meant to include by this phrase both the
"substantial evidence" standard (see id. at 919) and, because he had considered whether
the statutory phrase "upon the merits" might suggest review de novo, de novo review as
well. His analysis of the evidence upon which the Board's action was said to be based
certainly seems to support this interpretation.
168. See id. at 919-21.
169. Soon after Judge Sporkin's decision, officials at the OTS and RTC indicated their
intention to take strong enforcement action against attorneys and other professionals.
See, e.g., Duke & Noah, Thrift Agency is to Sue Some Attorneys, Others in Wake of Lincoln S&L Decision, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at B6, col. 4; Knight, S&L Regulators Vow
to Hold ProfessionalsResponsible, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1990, at Dl , ol. 1. See also
McCoy, Schmitt & Bailey, Hall of Shame: Besides S&L Owners, Host of Professionals
Paved Way for Crisis, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1990, at A4, col. I (reporting on the role of
professionals in the S&L "catastrophe"). Two weeks later it was reported that the OTS
was planning to clamp down on accountants and lawyers who had advised abusive thrift
managements. See Zuckerman, Thrift Office Planning PenaltiesAgainst Accountants, Attorneys, Am. Banker, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1. Five days later the OTS recirculated another
story confirming the same trend. See Knight, S&L CrisisBreeds Tough Group of Regulatory Enforcers, Wash. Post., Nov. 19, 1990, at A2. On the same day a similar article,
reporting the increased likelihood of enforcement against directors and officers, was published. See Welling, Directors and Officers Face GreaterRisk of Liability, Am. Banker,
Nov. 19, 1990, at 4.
See generally Villa, Accountants, Lawyers Face an Enforcement Threat, Am. Banker,
April 10, 1991, at 4. Cf also Duke, OT Is trying to Regulate the Accounting Profession,
Thrift Regulator, Dec. 14, 1990; Tolchin, Accounting Firm's Pact On S.&L. 's, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1990, at D7, col. 6 (reporting on a cease and desist agreement reached
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hailed the Lincoln decision as a major victory.' 7 0
The OTS' Lincoln victory was followed in 1991 by another in the
Tenth Circuit. In Franklin Savings Association v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,17 1 a unanimous panel reversed the district court holding that the Director of OTS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
appointing a conservator, "not for the purpose of liquidation," but only
to prevent further deterioration in Franklin's condition. In the panel's
view, the record amply supported the Director's decision to appoint the
conservator and the trial judge had failed to accord sufficient deference to
the Director's findings concerning Franklin's safety and soundness. The
appeals court did emphasize that the case did "not involve the more severe decision to appoint a conservator for the purpose of liquidation."'"
Nevertheless, the opinion is thoroughly reasoned and constitutes, in this
author's opinion, a correct exposition of the principles of administrative
law applicable to reviewing the appointment of both conservators and
receivers. 173

Yet even against this background of strong judicial support for the
seizure and broadened enforcement powers of the banking agencies, a
series of recent decisions have gone against the regulators. These include
one that was reached after a full bench trial, 74 two that were decided on
motions for17summary
judgment, 175 and one that was decided on a motion
6
to dismiss.
In the case that went to trial, FranklinSavings Association v. Director
of the Office of Thrift Supervision," the OTS appointed a conservator for
Franklin. The S&L challenged this appointment and, after an eighteenday trial, Judge Saffels found that the OTS and its agents had drawn
arbitrary conclusions and had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in numerous respects concerning the treatment of Franklin's assets and liabilibetween the accountants and oTs,about which the Director of OTS,T. Timothy Ryan,
was quoted as saying: "This is a significant case ....It says loud and clear that we hold
accountants, lawyers and other professionals accountable for their actions, just as we do
S.&.L. directors and officers.").
170. See Judge Sporkin Upholds FHLBB Takeover of Keating's Lincoln Savings and
Loan, 55 Banking Report (BNA) 344, 345-46 (Aug. 27, 1990).
171. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
172. d at 1141.
173. The OTS also secured a minor victory in the Fourth Circuit on a collateral appeal
in which the Fourth Circuit reversed a district judge's ruling that the former Director of
OTS,M. Danny Wall, could be deposed concerning his mental processes in reaching the
decision to appoint a conservator. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209 (4th
Cir. 1991) (applying the well-established Morgan principle that such questions, absent
extraordinary circumstances, are clearly improper. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409 (1941)).
174. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the 01S, 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D.Kan.
1990).
175. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Texas Am.
Bancshares v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1254 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
176. See Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of the First Republicbank Corp. v.
FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
177. 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
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ties. Taking the view that this was "not a case involving an infamous or
notorious savings and loan association" or one "involving fraud, corruption, or self-dealing by the management or directors," the judge reached
the conclusion that "[e]ssentially, this case boils down to a dispute over
accounting practices.""" 8 OTS' action, Judge Saffels opined, was most
likely "motivated by the disturbing events that had occurred earlier with
regard to Silverado Savings and Loan in Colorado and... [OTS/To17 9
peka's] difficulty with Franklin's unique and innovative operations."
Among the many grounds for the OTS's action was the relationship between Franklin Savings and its parent company, Franklin Savings Corporation ("FSC"): like Lincoln Savings and American Continental
Corporation, 8 ° Franklin Savings and FSC had mutual tax agreements;
unlike the case in Lincoln Savings, however, the agreements had long
been known to the FHLBB and OTS,had been acquiesced in by them,
and were not designed to upstream funds from the thrift to its parent.
The court ruled that OTS' treatment of the agreements as raising concern
about the safety and soundness of Franklin Savings was arbitrary and
82
capricious."1 The court ordered the OTS to remove its conservator.1
The remaining cases were in the Northern District of Texas, although
each was adjudicated by a different judge. All involved the seizure of
bank subsidiaries of large holding companies: in the Senior Unsecured
Creditors' case,"8 3 the holding corporation was First RepublicBank Corporation, the rescue of whose flagship bank by the FDIC was, at the
time, "the largest bank rescue effort in history.""' The rescue failed and
all 41 of the First RepublicBank Corp's subsidiary banks were declared
insolvent and seized by the Comptroller. Unsecured creditors' committees of the holding corporation and one of its subsidiaries brought suit
against the FDIC claiming, among other things, that the FDIC, in providing open bank assistance to the flagship bank, had devised the assistance in a manner designed to manufacture the insolvency of the sister
banks; had engaged in transfers in contemplation of insolvency; and had
discriminated as between creditors in violation of the National Bank
178. Id. at 1094. As two commentators have noted, the court went to unusual lengths
to reevaluate the expert testimony of accounting experts at the trial. See Dobbins &
Davis, The Franklin Decision and the Limits of Regulatory Authority, 3 Banking L. Rev.
3, 6 (Winter 1991).
179. FranklinSavings, 742 F. Supp. at 1124. Judge Saffels went on to note that Franklin had not, however, shown that the regulators' actions were motivated by bias, prejudice
or bad faith. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 164-170.
181. See Franklin Savings, 742 F. Supp. at 1119.
182. The Tenth Circuit immediately thereafter granted a stay, and subsequently reversed the decision. See FranklinSavings, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); see also supra
text accompanying notes 171-73 (discussing tenth circuit decision).
183. Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First Republicbank Corp. v. FDIC, 749
F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
184. Id. at 760 (quoting Tr. Oral Arg.at 1 (John L. Rogers, I1, Esq., counsel for the
FDIC)).
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Act. 8 5 Although the court dismissed many of the other claims, and also
appeared somewhat skeptical of the validity of those just mentioned,
Judge Fitzwater declined to dismiss the claims concerning the manufacturing of insolvency, transfers in contemplation of insolvency, and the
alleged inequitable impact of the FDIC's purchase and assumption transactions on creditors. 8 6 Even if the FDIC ultimately is vindicated on the
facts and law, the decision undoubtedly will impose a significant fetter on
the agency's freedom to act in large-scale bank seizures.
This view is reinforced by the other decisions. Texas American Bancshares"' involved the seizure of Texas American's twenty-two national
and two state bank subsidiaries. The seizures by the Comptroller (in the
case of ten of the national banks) and the Texas Banking Commissioner
(in the case of the two state banks) had taken place after the FDIC had
notified the Comptroller that these banks, which were otherwise solvent
and were creditors of the (by then) insolvent lead subsidiary bank, would
receive no more than sixty-seven percent of the face amounts of the obligations owed them by the lead bank. This default rendered the remaining banks insolvent. The holding company, the ten "solvent" national
banks, and the two state banks, then brought an action against the
Comptroller and the Texas Bank Commissioner, alleging that their insolvency had been engineered by the FDIC in order to enable the FDIC to
sell the entire TAB bank system as a package. The FDIC was alleged to
have deliberately devalued the assets placed by the solvent banks in the
insolvent lead bank. The Court found strong support for this allegation"Is and took the view that the FDIC was under an obligation to treat
all creditors, including the sister subsidiaries, equitably. 8 9 The court
concluded that "the facts of this case indicate an equally egregious use of
the FDIC's extensive (but not unlimited) powers by manipulating the
recovery of affiliated banks on the obligations owed to them in order to
make those banks insolvent as well."' Citing the Ninth Circuit in First
Empire 191 and quoting from its own circuit, the court concluded in terms
extremely critical of the banking agencies:
This Circuit has been similarly wary of the FDIC's and the Comptroller's claims of unbridled discretion. The Fifth Circuit warned [that]
... '[t]he Comptroller must not become so obsessed with protecting
the integrity of the national banking system that individual banks are
185. See 12 U.S.C. § 194. This provision has been amended by FIRREA, § 212(a),
which the court held to have prospective force only. 749 F. Supp. at 773-74; First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919
(1978); Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
186. See Senior Unsecured Creditors, 749 F. Supp. at 768, 771, 772, 776.
187. Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
188. Id. at 1247.
189. On the equal treatment principle formerly contained in the National Bank Act,
see supra note 115.
190. Texas American Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1253.
191. First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 919 (1978).
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arbitrarily treated unfairly.' .... in the FDIC's rush to salvage what
all admit to be a difficult situation, it could not violate Congress' explicit directive to treat creditors equally by choosing among creditors
only those whom it considered worthy of full payment. 192
In the same vein, Chief Judge Porter in the much-publicized MCorp
case, 193 granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff holding company (and holding company/subsidiary) and against the Comptroller
and FDIC. MCorp claimed that the FDIC had conspired with the
Comptroller to engineer, by means of the conditions attached to the
FDIC's open bank assistance and the manipulation of the access on the
part of MCorp's subsidiary national banks to the Federal Reserve Bank
discount window, the insolvency of the entire MBank system, in order
that the FDIC would be able offer the entire package to prospective buyers. The court found that the FDIC deliberately chose not to close the
MBanks as they became insolvent; instead, the agency decided to wait
until it was in a position to create the insolvency of an additional twelve
MBanks as well. Judge Porter, finding that the court had jurisdiction to
entertain the suit for damages, 94 rejected the various defenses raised by
the FDIC and the Comptroller, found that, as in the previous two eases,
the principle of equal treatment of creditors had been violated. Additionally, the Court found that the claim by MCorp that the FDIC had plotted with the Comptroller to engineer the insolvency of the entire MBank
system was supported by the evidence. 195 Indeed, the opinion records
some embarrassing evidence from the minutes of two 1988 FDIC meetings at which this objective was frankly discussed, and apparently agreed
upon, by the FDIC Board and its staff.'9 6 The court ordered the parties
to prepare briefing on the amount of damages,' 9 7 and the case has subse-

quently been settled on terms a good deal more adverse to the FDIC, it
seems, than the agency had originally expected.
It remains to be seen whether the Fifth Circuit, unlike the Tenth Circuit, will sustain the district courts in their rigorous attitude toward the
agencies. For the time being, however, the banking regulators can hardly
be described as enjoying clear sailing in every case in which they have
chosen to use their ultimate enforcement weapon: seizure of the
institution.
192. Texas America Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1254 (quoting, in part, from First
Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983)).
193. MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
194. The court's jurisdictional analysis is somewhat questionable insofar as it seems to
confuse some distinct jurisdictional issues. See id. at 1407-12.
195. See id. at 1408.
196. See id. at 1414-15.
197. See 755 F. Supp. at 1423.
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D. Potential Tort Liability of the Banking Agencies for the Seizure
and Operation of Depository Institutions
The Supreme Court recently averted a potential nightmare for the regulators concerning the possibility of tort liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA")198 for the negligent operation of depository institutions already seized. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity on the

part of the United States with respect to tort liability, but it contains a
"discretionary function exception," in terms of which immunity is retained in the case of claims based upon acts involving the "exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee, whether or not

the discretion involved be abused." 199
The discretionary function exception has proved difficult to apply in
practice,'

but in the case of seizures of depository institutions, there has

been clear agreement in the courts that it operates to protect the regulators from suits claiming negligence in the initial determination of insolvency and the decision to seize the institution."

On the other hand, the

Fifth Circuit ruled in 1989 that the exception would not apply where,
having seized the institution, the regulators then mismanaged it so badly

as to cause loss.' ° The effect of this decision would have been to expose
the FDIC and the RTC to enormous claims for damages in the case of
institutions under their conservatorship and receivership which continued to deteriorate (as many, perhaps most, certainly do) after seizure.
In United States v. Gaubert,0 3 however, the Supreme Court has
scotched such potential suits by reversing the Fifth Circuit in broad and
unequivocal terms. In its unanimous decision,' the Court emphasized
that, whenever the agency or its employees exercised judgment "involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the social, economic, or political goals of the [governing] statute and regulations," they
are protected by the immunity.' 5 These choices include the "[day-today management of banking affairs" which, "like the management of
other businesses, regularly require judgment as to which of a range of
permissible courses is the wisest," and "discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level."'
The effect of the Court's inter198. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1974).
200. For a survey of recent developments in the field, see Byse, Recent Developments in

Federal Administrative Law: Damage Actions Against the Government or Government
Employees, 4 Admin. LJ.275, 287-91 (1990), and references cited therein.
201. See FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1990); Golden Pacific
Bancorp. v. Clarke, 837 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988).
202. See Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1267 (1991).
203. 111 S.Ct. 1267 (1991).
204. Scalia delivered a separate concurrence, but agreed with "much of the opinion of
the Court." Id. at 1280.
205. Id. at 1270.
206. Id. at 1275.
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pretation of the discretionary function exception in the context of
banking conservatorships and receiverships is to restrict very severely the
range of actions on the part of the regulators that could conceivably give
rise to liability in tort. Examples of the latter would be the failure to
carry out a non-discretionary mandate contained in an applicable statute
or regulation, or negligent decisions resting on "mathematical calculations" involving "no choice or judgment in carrying out the
calculations." 20 7
The Gaubert decision obviously came as a major relief to the regulators,2 °8 although, as the MCorp case indicates,2 "9 the relationship between liability under Administrative Procedure Act principles and
liability in tort has yet to be worked out, and it may well be that the
regulators still run the risk of liability where they have abused their powers in order to create an insolvency. In any event, as the Franklin Savings case2 10 illustrates, non-monetary relief might still be available where
arbitrariness can be established.2 11
III.

THE REGULATORY DILEMMA

Whether or not one agrees with the outcome of all the judicial disputes
surveyed in the preceding sections, there can be no doubt that litigants
have frequently achieved success in the courts and that, with respect to
many aspects of enforcement activity, the courts have played an active
role in curbing the actions of the banking agencies, their rhetoric of deference notwithstanding. In an environment of increasingly formal enforcement action, it clearly pays some institutions and their "affiliates" to
seek judicial review of the agencies' actions, and the threat of costly judicial proceedings might well become an inhibiting factor, for good or ill,
in the minds of agency enforcers. An important question to be considered, then, given the extra burden that judicial review places upon the
bailout and supervisory processes, is this: is the frequency of litigation
likely to continue, or will the law relating to enforcement become clarified, thereby reducing the incidence of litigation?
The answer proposed here is that, while the questions concerning preFIRREA capital agreements are likely soon to be settled by the Supreme
Court, and while highly specific disputes concerning agency powers
(such as whether the Fed's source of strength doctrine may be enforced)
207. Id. at 1278.
208. See Garsson, High Court Backs Regulators In Suit by Failed S&L's Chief, Am.
Banker, Mar. 27, 1991, at 2.
209. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991); see also supra text
accompanying notes 193-197 (discussing MCorp).
210. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 942 F.Supp. 1089 (D. Kan.
1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 17782 (discussing case).
211. Note the distinction between "abuse of discretion" for FTCA purposes and
"abuse of discretion" for APA purposes and suits challenging the appointment of conservatorships and receiverships.
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are also likely soon to be settled by the Supreme Court and Congress,
substantial litigation concerning the way in which the agencies' enforcement powers are used is likely to continue and, as the post-FIRREA
enforcement orders begin to reach the courts, might significantly increase
until the enactment of substantial reforms, concerning both the allocation of power among the banking agencies and the availability of deposit
insurance.
There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, while some process
of adjustment to a more formal and vigorous enforcement environment is
likely to take place, the resulting decrease in uncertainty and the sense of
unfairness (which might be driving some of the current judicial activism)
is unlikely to have a major impact on the number of cases reaching the
courts. Second, the banking agencies (and the FDIC in particular) are
caught up in a cross-current of conflicting purposes, generating at the
very least the appearance of improper motivation for some of the most
serious enforcement action taken-an appearance which is likely to create, as it already has, a good deal of sympathy on the part of judges
towards the "victims" of enforcement action. Until a strong institutional
separation is created between the agency responsible for the cleanup and
the agencies responsible for enforcement, this state of affairs could
persist.
Third, the industry and the agencies have to operate in an increasingly
diverse commercial environment, yet they also have to continue acting
on the basis of assumptions that are less likely than before to be mutually
shared. The concept of safety and soundness, except where it is explicitly
defined by statute or rule, is hardly likely to be "generally understood" in
the diverse world of modem financial services. At the same time, the
agencies have been forced into the position of having to exercise much
more conscious watch over the well-being of depository institutions because taxpayers' money is at stake. The agencies have become, in other
words, "equity holders" in each insured institution. This is beginning
profoundly to influence, in a controversial way, their perception of what
constitute unsafe and unsound practices. It is quite possible that the disagreements surrounding the bases for enforcement actions will be reflected by the courts on judicial review and, given the almost infinitely
varied contexts in which the disputes are likely to arise, it is hard to see
how the Supreme Court could add much certainty.
A. Adjustment Problems?
The evolution of a more formal enforcement environment, and the
great enhancement of enforcement powers, probably are factors contributing to the increase in enforcement litigation and, in turn, to the closer
scrutiny that courts appear to be giving enforcement actions. The penal-
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2 12
ties are serious and so must be taken more seriously by the courts;
background constitutional anxieties (which troubled Congress itself
when it increased the scope and scale of the enforcement powers) 2 13 are
likely to continue to operate as a constraint against deference in the
minds of judges;214 and the agencies have to cover so broad a field of
operations that mistakes requiring correction on review seem inevitable.

212. Cf Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 765 F.2d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (small size of civil
penalty significant in determining that the penalty was not arbitrary and capricious).
The power of agencies to enforce, through their own proceedings, very large and essentially punitive civil penalties creates some cause for concern. The Administrative Conference of the United States, which has commissioned two major studies on the
administrative imposition of civil penalties, has always assumed that extremely large penalties should be imposed through the judicial process and not through the agencies' own
administrative adjudications. In encouraging the adoption of civil penalties as an agency
sanction, it was never envisaged that agencies should substitute for the courts in imposing
essentially punitive sanctions. See Admin. Conference of the U.S., Civil Money Penalties
as a Sanction, Recommendation No. 72-6, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-6 (1990).
213. The House Judiciary Committee took into account, in its deliberations on the
House version of FIRREA (H.R. 1278), the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See H. Rep. No. 101-54, pt. 5, Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Report of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, at 6 (June 1, 1989). Halper was a case involving double jeopardy: in joint
criminal and civil judicial proceedings, Halper had received both criminal punishment
and a civil fine for engaging in Medicare-related fraud; subsequently, a government
agency imposed on him a civil penalty which was so large that, as the Court held, it bore
no rational relationship to the loss suffered by the government and it therefore crossed
"the line between remedy and punishment," 490 U.S. 450, thereby exposing Halper to
double jeopardy. Although the Court emphasized that its decision was confined to the
question of double jeopardy, id. at 436, the Court's insistence on looking to the substantive nature of the penalty, as opposed to its "civil" label (a "functional" rather than
"formal" approach), when determining whether the penalty was primarily punitive or
remedial, id., suggests that there might be due process, Article III, and trial-by-jury
problems with the administrative imposition of very large penalties which bear no relation to the actual losses inflicted. The Judiciary Committee did not investigate these
broader implications, confining itself only to a concern for the constitutionality of the
civil penalty provisions relating to judicialproceedings. On the implications of Halperfor
judicial enforcement proceedings, see Glickman, CivilSanctions and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to ParallelProceedings after United
States v. Halper, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251 (1990).
214. Cf Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984).
In addition to concerns raised by the Halper decision, discussed in the immediately
preceding note, another recent decision of the Supreme Court conceivably has potential
implications for the agency sanction system established by FIRREA. In Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), a majority of the Court recommitted itself to the
principle of trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment where the adjudication of "private rights" is at stake and the suit resembles an action at common law. Id. at 50-55.
The power to order restitution and reimbursement, incorporated by FIRREA into the
banking agencies' cease and desist powers involves an allocation of liability between parties (institution-affiliated parties and the depository institutions which they have harmed)
and might conceivably give rise to a right to trial by jury. But it is more likely that such
"private rights" would be regarded as having acquired a "public" complexion by virtue of
the valid delegation of this adjudicative power to the agencies the government's interest in
the safety and soundness of the institutions concerned, the provision of federal deposit
insurance, and the closely regulated nature of banking. See id. at 52-55; see also Paul v.
OTS, No. 90-2496-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 4, 1990) (reproduced in Current
Developments, supra note 76, 118-27) (rejecting plaintiff's Seventh Amendment claim).
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On the other hand, the development by the agencies of a structured set
of principles governing enforcement, whether through rules2"' or as a
result of the increased volume and publicity of agency adjudication,
should do much to reduce the uncertainty regarding the manner in which
enforcement sanctions will be applied in areas where the basis for enforcement itself is not in dispute. Furthermore, the results on judicial
review are likely to have a feedback effect on the agencies as their administrative law judges take into account principles articulated by the courts
in prior cases.
The adjustment factor, I would therefore suggest, is not likely in itself
to generate unusual difficulties concerning judicial review of enforcement
action. More important are the structural and conflict of interest
problems associated with the changed environment of banking
enforcement.
B. Supervision or Bailout?
A deeper problem is the conflict of purposes toward which the banking
agencies, and the FDIC in particular, are directed. On the one hand,
each of the supervisory agencies is under immense public pressure to prevent the growth of, and indeed to eliminate as far as possible, the insider
abuses that, have played so important a role in the S&L and banking
crises. They are expected, in other words, to engage in a general cleanup
of the industry in order to protect the deposit insurance funds from further losses. To this end, they have been directed to use their enforcement
powers to the fullest extent, and they are also being encouraged to engage
in preemptive action, or "early intervention." 21 6
At the same time, the FDIC (and the RTC2" 7 ) are also required to
engage in a general "cleanout" of the industry. The FDIC has the
unenviable task of implementing a badly underfunded "bailout" of both
the thrift and banking industries through the discharge of its open bank,
conservatorship and receivership duties, a good proportion of which involve the sale of ailing institutions, or at least their best assets, as quickly
as possible and with the least possible further expense to the insurance
funds and the taxpayers: it is simply not politically feasible to obtain
adequate resources from the public fisc. The FDIC must, in other words,
try to sustain the bailout "on the cheap," by selling off the deadwood in
the industry to the healthy section of the industry.
215. See, eg., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Interagency Policy
Regarding the Assessment of Civil Money Penaltiesby the Federal FinancialInstitutions

Regulatory Agencies, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,423 (1980); OTS, Orders Nos. 90-331, 90-332, and
90-333 (effective Feb. 12, 1990)(stating enforcement policies, specific policies relating to
imposition of civil money penalties, and OTS' statutory powers and procedures used in
initiating and pursuing formal investigation).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 83-92.
217. Given the partial institutional isolation and the highly specific tasks of the RTC,
the comments in this section do not apply to the RTC itself.
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It should come as no surprise, therefore, that charges of conspiracy by
the FDIC with other supervisory agencies to engineer the insolvencies of
saleable bank systems have been made, and that these charges appear to
have been established by credible evidence in the courts.21 8 Could the
pressure to appear to be doing something successful also be the explanation for the OTS' apparent eagerness to seize thrifts (either because of
disagreements concerning accounting principles,21 9 or because, though
seemingly viable at the time of seizure, they had fallen foul of the Office's
new capital standards, often precisely because they had earlier taken on
dead thrifts of which the OTS' predecessor could not otherwise dispose)?22 No doubt the OTS would protest this explanation and would
assert error on the part of the courts involved, but it is unlikely that the
sympathy of so many courts towards the victims of these forms of enforcement action could be so completely misplaced.
At any rate, what remains disturbing is that some of the cases suggest
perhaps more than just the appearanceof impropriety on the part of the
agencies. While perhaps politically satisfying in the short term, summary action is not always going to be fair to those exposed to the agencies' enforcement powers, and, if some enforcement action has actually
been taken merely to slake a public thirst for vengeance, or to produce
apparent successes in conducting the cleanup, this would actually be contrary to the public interest insofar as the unsalable deadwood institutions
would continue to lose more and more money.2 2 1 If the complaints are
based on something more than self-serving rhetoric, then it seems entirely possible that courts, faced firsthand with the effects of drastic enforcement action on the particular institutions, will continue to adopt a
role in protecting these institutions against the
relatively interventionist
222
regulators.
C. Depositors and Taxpayers or Bankers and Stockholders? The "New
EntrepreneurialState"
An even deeper difficulty, and one that is likely to be more pervasive
and enduring, is the incongruous new enforcement environment that has
evolved in response to the S&L and banking crises. The nation still needs
218. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Texas Am. Bancshares v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Tex. 1990). Cf. Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First Republicbank Corporation v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex.
1990) (court apparently skeptical about the creditors' claims).
219. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1089, 1109-15 (D.
Kan. 1990).
220. See the "regulatory goodwill" cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 13654.
221. Cf Hansen Say. Bank v. OTS, 758 F. Supp. 240, 247 (D.N.J. 1991) ("By enforcing FIRREA's capital standards on [Hansen Savings], the OTS will create the situation it
seeks to avoid: creating an insolvent thrift which becomes part of the public charge. The
result is far from being in the public interest.").
222. See supra note 167 (discussing the comments of Judge Saffels in the Franklin
Savings case).
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the financial services that are provided by thrifts and banks. There is no
state-owned bank industry. The agencies therefore also have a responsibility to permit-indeed, foster-the prosperity, and therefore the entrepreneurial activities of the (privately-owned and operated) industry.
Even if they so wished, they would never have the managerial resources
to do otherwise. At this point, the function of the regulators is to maintain boundary control, leaving the members of the industry free to get on
with banking and thrift business as long as they remain within the parameters set by Congress and the regulators. As far as it goes, this regulatory model is quite consistent with the roles performed (at least in
theory) by many federal agencies.
Because of the special importance of banking to the money supply,
however, it has also always been accepted that the role of banking regulators must be much more intrusive than is the case for other industries. In
order to sustain the circulating medium 3 and in order to protect depositors, the regulators have long been charged with ensuring the safety and
soundness of the institutions they supervise. It is not enough that these
institutions refrain from violating norms of fair or proper behavior:
wherever possible, they must be protected from engaging in conduct that
might lead them to fall into insolvency. So we have tended to refer to the
banking agencies as supervisors, as well as regulators. Under this supervisory model, it was entirely appropriate that the regulators should for so
long have worked in such close, continuous and informal cooperation
with the industry. 24
The S&L and banking crises have, however, led to a subversion of the
supervisory model. In angry response to the public cost of the S&L crisis, and to the abuses that are responsible for so much of this cost, Congress has enthusiastically conferred massive enforcement powers on the
banking agencies." 2 In the process, Congress has quite consciously and
dramatically enhanced the law enforcement role of these agencies, and it
has done so because of the exposure of the taxpayers through the deposit
insurance system. The old form of close, but informal, regulation, which
was followed by an interlude of irresponsible deregulation," 6 might have
been displaced by a new "reregulation" that could well result in an acute
223. This monetary policy aspect of deposit insurance sometimes tends to be forgotten.
[lit is clear from both the statements and actions of many proponents and administrators of bank-obligation insurance systems that the primary object has
not been to guard the individual depositor or noteholder against loss but, instead, to restore to the community, as quickly as possible, circulating medium
destroyed or made unavailable as a consequence of bank failures. In this view,
bank-obligation insurance has a monetary function, and the protection of the
small creditor against loss is incidental to the achievement of the primary
objective.
Golembe, The Deposit InsuranceLegislation of 1933: An Examination of its Antecedents
and its Purposes, 75 Pol. Sc. Q. 181, 189 (1960)
224. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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case of regulatory mismatch.2 27 Formal, retributive sanctions constitute
part of the technique available for shaping decisions and strategies that
really ought to be based on sensitive, highly discrete and differentiated
business judgments.
At the same time, as guardians of the deposit insurance funds, whether
direct (as in the case of the FDIC) or indirect (as in the case of the Fed,
OCC and OTS), the agencies have had to become, in many respects, "equity holders" in the banking industry.228 Paradoxically, therefore, the
agencies also have a greater interest than ever in fostering the prosperity
of the banking industry, and the entrepreneurial risks that are inevitably
associated with the furtherance of this prosperity in an increasingly competitive and complex financial services environment.22 9
This, in turn, has produced a major convolution in the role of the regulators. The combined imposition upon the banking agencies of the law
enforcement model, on the one hand, and the equity holder perspective,
on the other, seems in the banking arena to have led to the emergence of
an unusual form of regulation that we might call the entrepreneurial
state. The entrepreneurial state created by the combination of events just
outlined takes the form of agencies with a powerful law enforcement mission, vested with the responsibility not only for policing the boundaries
of fair play but also with: punishing and incapacitating the miscreants;
cleaning out the industry deadwood; protecting and regenerating the federal insurance funds; fostering the general prosperity of the industry; facilitating the diversification of the industry in the face of increasing and
possibly fatal competition from other sectors of the financial services industry; and, of course, regulating the money supply!
Because the easiest aspect for Congress to deal with in assisting the
agencies with these tasks is the "law and order" aspect, among the most
extensive and readily available tools that have been conferred on the
agencies are their enhanced enforcement powers. The result that might
well be developing is that of a law-enforcement tail attempting to wag an
entrepreneurial dog. In other words, the bureaucratic techniques of
traditional formal agency enforcement sanctions are being used to direct,
227. See, e.g., S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 191-96 (1982)(discussing regulatory mismatches); C. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 89 (1990)(same).
228. See, e.g., Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspectiveon Bank Regulation in
a DeregulatoryAge, 57 Fordhamn L. Rev. 501 (1989) (describing the shift, on the part of
the banking regulators, from the role of debtholders to that of equityholders). For early
recognition of this development, see Serino, supra note 23, at 155 ("Since the regulator
functions initially to protect the depositors and the shareholders, he should be given the
tools to ensure that management is performing with the best interests of the bank in
mind. Where management does not, it, not the bank, should suffer.").
229. New developments and innovations in the financial services industry, many of
which are placing competitive stresses on the traditional banking and thrift industries, are
being reported in the media on an almost daily basis. For a good overview, see A Survey
of InternationalBanking, The Economist, Apr. 7, 1990.
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on an after-the-fact basis, the entrepreneurial decisions of the owners and
managers of depository institutions.

The effects of this schizoid model are already beginning to manifest
themselves. For example, the Chief Counsel of the OTS, Harris Weinstein, has espoused two controversial theories upon the basis of which he
contends that the OTS is justified in taking vigorous enforcement action
against institution-affiliated parties.1 0 The first relates to the fiduciary
duties of officers, directors, and other parties involved in the management
of depository institutions,"1 and the second relates more specifically to
the ethical responsibilities
of attorneys rendering services to depository
3
institutions."

As far as institution-affiliated parties in general are concerned, Counsellor Weinstein, employing one of the law's "most exotic species,"" m
argues that, because depositors expect that they will receive repayment of
their deposits, and because federal deposit insurance guarantees this repayment, the directors and officers of depository institutions owe a fiduciary duty to the federal insurer: "[E]very fiduciary of a federally insured
depository institution owes the federal insurer, at the very minimum, the
very same high fiduciary duties that are owed depositors," including "the

duty not to risk insolvency and the resulting loss of funds deposited with
the institution."'
230. It is not clear whether Counsellor Weinstein also expresses the views of the other
banking regulators. The 0TS view that the agencies have a responsibility to impose fiduciary standards based on the federal statutes (and not merely according to relevant state
law), see OTY Issues C&D OrderAgainst Nell Bush for Engaging in Conflicts of Interest,
56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 761, 762 (Apr. 22, 1991), is certainly shared at the OCC see
OCC Can Narrow, Deny Outer Limits of State-Granted Fiduciary Powers, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 991 (1990), and is surely correct. On the other hand, when it comes to the
proper interpretation of the required standards insofar as these apply to attorneys, the
General Counsel of the FDIC is on record as declining to go quite as far as the OTS Chief
Counsel. See FDIC General Counsel Declines to Embrace HigherDutyfor Fiduciariesin
FailingBanks, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 941-42 (1990).
231. See, e.g., Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institudon Fiduciaries,55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510 (Sept. 24, 1990) (text of speech delivered at
Southern Methodist University, Sept. 13, 1990); Bank, Thrift Attorneys React to Duties
Outlined by 073 Chief Counsel Weinstein, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 547 (Oct. 1, 1990)
(reporting on further remarks by Chief Counsel Weinstein to the Exchequer Club, Sept.
19, 1990).
232. See, eg., Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May be Unethical,OTS' Weinstein
Says, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 616 (1991) (reporting on a panel discussion sponsored by
the Administrative Conference of the United States entitled "Where were the Lawyers?,"
Washington, D.C., Mar. 21, 1991); Ohio, LouisianaDraft Bills Would Limit Liability of
Bank and Thrift Attorneys, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Apr. 17, 1991 (reporting
proceedings of the Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of Business
Law, where Weinstein elaborated further on his "whole law" concept) [hereinafter Draft

Bills].

233. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1988 Duke UJ.
879, 923.
234. Speech by OT ChiefCounsel Weinstein on Dutiesof DepositoryInstitution Fiduciaries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (Sept. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Weinstein Speech].
Weinstein bases this conclusion on three "Hornbook principles": the federal insurer is
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By way of illustration, Weinstein uses the hypothetical of a savings
bank that has had to increase its loan loss reserves because the value of
its primary real estate market has declined. Hoping that the economic
downturn causing the decline is about to hit bottom, the bank's board is
considering the possibility of engaging in a large urban residential development which, though risky, would be very profitable if the real estate
market actually recovers. On the other hand, the board is aware that the
failure of the project would have a "devastating impact" on the bank's
current capital position. In these circumstances, Weinstein asks, "[w]hat
are the board's duties- and to whom are they owed?" "The only conscionable legal conclusion," he argues, "is that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the holder of the potentially unlimited negative equity risk,
e.g. [sic] the United States government, and that directors who fail to
consider the potential effect of the transaction on the government breach
their duty."2 35 The directors would therefore be in breach of their duty if
they decided to evaluate the risk exclusively from the point of view of the
common shareholders and take the risk of investing in the project because the potential benefits greatly outweigh the potential loss.
As to Counsellor Weinstein's position regarding the professionals engaged by depository institutions (and attorneys in particular), he maintains that they have an ethical and enforceable obligation to practice
"whole law," by which he means that an attorney advising or acting on
behalf of a depository institution must determine "his or her true obligations by reference to regulatory requirements, concepts of safety and
soundness, and fiduciary responsibilities. 2 36 Attorneys who, when advising their depository institution clients, restrict themselves to furnishing advice on how to exploit regulatory or legislative loopholes, namely
those who fail to make further enquiries as to whether prudent legal advice has been furnished with regard to other, related aspects of the activities they are reviewing when they see "red flags" indicating that such
advice should be obtained, are liable to attract the attention of the enforcement staff of the OTS.2 37 For example, it is not enough for an attorney to advise whether a federally-chartered thrift may legally convert to
a state charter; "broader questions of law" must also be considered.238
Counsellor Weinstein's views, backed up as they are by the enormous
subrogated to the rights of the depositors, who have the right to seek restitution and
money damages from fiduciaries; deposit insurance is analogous to equity, and corporate
fiduciaries therefore owe a duty to the government; and the government is in the position
of a creditor to a nearly-insolvent or insolvent debtor, hence the fiduciaries of such "debtors" "should ... be primarily concerned with the interests of that institution's largest
creditor, e.g. [sic] the U.S. government. The closer an institution is to [in]solvency, the
more paramount does the duty to the government become." Id.
235. Id. at 512.
236. Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says, 56
Banking Rep. (BNA) 616 (April 1, 1991) [hereinafter How to Exploit Loopholes].
237. See id. at 617.
238. Id.
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enforcement powers of the OTS and the actual use of these powers, 9
have caused some degree of consternation in the legal profession. The
novel, uncertain and controversial nature of these standards of professional conduct, 2" not to mention their retroactive application, have led
to protests from the bar.24 Members of the accounting profession have
registered their own complaints 2 (perhaps somewhat less vigorously,

however, since it has long been recognized that accountants perform an
important "public watchdog" function, requiring them to ascertain inde-

pendently the veracity of their client's financial statements, 24 3 and, in the
case of clients subject to federal securities laws, to inform the SEC of
deficiencies in the client's financial statements where the client fails to do
so2). Returning to Counsellor Weinstein's strict views with respect to

the fiduciary duties of directors and officers, it also comes as no surprise

that bankers have protested that it is difficult to anticipate the expectations of the regulators as far as their duties are concerned.24 5
Yet the position espoused by Weinstein is understandable given the
unusual position in which the federal banking agencies find themselves.
The federal deposit insurance funds are providing the backup for depository institution activity. The questions of safety and soundness that now
fall under the surveillance of the banking agencies in an increasingly diversified, volatile and competitive financial services market, and the political atmosphere in which government is expected to "do something,"
have all combined to propel the banking agencies into a position where
239. See supra note 88; see also Labaton, PuttingLawyers Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Tunes,
Mar. 21, 1991, at C2, col. 1.
240. It is not clear, for example, whether Counsellor Weinstein's standards of professional conduct to be observed by attorneys would comport with the lawyer's duties of
confidentiality (ABA Model Rule 1.6) and loyalty (ABA Model Rule 1.7) to his or her
client. More fundamentally, while an attorney may render advice concerning extra-legal
issues of morality, economics, social and political factors (ABA Model Rule 2.1), and in
the context of banking surely ought to, it is unclear what the ultimate scope of this advice
ought to be. As one attorney, addressing Counsellor Weinstein's expectations and referring to the obvious risk inherent in all banking decisions, has protested, "[o]ne man's
unsafe and unsound practice is another's business opportunity." Draft Bills, supra note
225. It is difficult fairly to base serious enforcement action on so intangible a duty.
241. See Weinstein Speech, supra note 227, at 547-48; How to Exploit Loopholes, supra
note 229, at 618. As one attorney put it, if Counsellor Weinstein's "whole law" approach
"means that when you're in doubt you consult the agency, I think there are a lot of
practitioners who will disagree about that." Id. Legislation is being prepared in two
states (Ohio and Louisiana) that would attempt to restrict the scope of the OTS' "whole
law" concept. Id.; see also Villa, supra note 76, (suggesting that "the resolve of professionals to contest the agencies' actions is building").
242. See 07S is Trying to Regulate the Accounting Profession, Thrift Regulator, Dec.
14, 1990 (No. 9047).
243. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984); see generally,
Murphy, Standards Governing Conduct of Officers, Directorsand Others, in Current Developments, supra note 76, at 389, 399-402.
244. See Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Murphy, supra note 242, at 400-01.
245. See Porter, RegulatorsIncrease the Risk for Bank Officers Directors,Am. Banker,
Feb. 6, 1991, at 4.
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they have to adopt the views urged by the OTS Chief Counsel. It is no
wonder that Counsellor Weinstein is attempting to recruit to his aid additional "policemen" 4 6 in the form of attorneys and accountants who
might have privileged access to information which the agency itself
would not discover until long after the damage has been done. And it is
also no wonder that he is attempting to deter as much risk-taking as
possible.
Even if the position of the agencies is an understandable one, however,
it might not be practical. The central problem is that safety and soundness is inextricably tied to the question of business judgment.24 7 Banking
regulators do, it is true, acquire considerable expertise in such matters
and so are well-qualified to evaluate banking decisions for their safety
and soundness. But in one respect they nearly always enjoy an advantage
that makes punitive enforcement action unfair and ineffective as a tool
for directing the welfare of the industry: they make their evaluations
with the benefit of hindsight and, if the theories of Counsellor Weinstein
do indeed express a legitimate basis of enforcement action, they do so
according to very high standards of prudence. In short, they operate
according to a "should-have-known standard" 248 which is not only as
unfair, in the case of honest institutions and institution-affiliated parties,
as is Monday morning quarterbacking, but which precisely because such
judgments cannot be made in advance is ineffective as a means of directing an institution in the future. On the contrary, the chilling effect
that is likely to result from heavy-handed enforcement based upon prophylactic principles of professional duty might well lead professionals
and, in turn, their depository institution clients, to err on the side of excessive caution, perhaps even to the ultimate detriment of the general
prosperity of the industry.
CONCLUSION

Two fundamental problems have been identified as far as the intensified enforcement activities of the banking regulators are concerned.
First, there is a conflict of purposes between the cleanout effort and the
continuing responsibility to ensure the maintenance of depository institution safety and soundness. There is some indication that the banking
246. See How to Exploit Loopholes, supra note 235, at 617-18 (suggestion by member of
the bar that this is what Weinstein is expecting attorneys to become).
The complicated policy implications associated with enforcement efforts to impose this
form of "gatekeeper" liability on accountants, lawyers, and other individuals involved
with corporate organizations are explored in Krakman, CorporateLiabilityStrategies and
the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984).
247. Cf Vartanian, Woes in Financial Industry Challenge Outside Directors, Am.
Banker, Apr. 6, 1990, at 4 ("many argue that the business judgment rule that normally
protects board decisions has been preempted and even trampled by the regulatory business judgment rule").
248. How to Exploit Loopholes, supra note 235, at 618 (one attorney's criticism of
Weinstein's "whole law" theory).
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agencies might not always have acted solely in the interests of safety and
soundness when they have closed some institutions; they may sometimes
have acted for other motives, such as fulfilling the appearance of implementing an effective cleanup operation.
Second, the pressure to engage in vigorous enforcement, the exposure
of taxpayers in the event of insolvencies, and the increasingly complex
nature of the markets in which the depository institutions operate (as
well as the polycentric characteristics of the business decisions that must
be made in that environment), have all combined to create a situation in
which both the basis for enforcement action and the appropriate ensuing
sanctions are bound to remain controversial and likely to spawn continuous challenges in court.
The resolution of these difficulties is inevitably bound up with the
broader structural and functional reform of the banking industry as a
whole. For example, the possible reduction in the coverage of federal
deposit insurance24 9 would, by reducing the degree of taxpayer exposure
to the costs of banking failure, help to reduce the pressure on the agencies to take inappropriate punitive action against depository institutions.
A transfer of the power to determine whether an institution is "too big to
fail,'"-involving "systemic risk" and monetary policy judgments-from
the FDIC to the Fed and Treasury,2 50 would help to separate monetary
and macroeconomic policy concerns from safety and soundness issues,
and might in turn help to reduce the number of arbitrary enforcement
results as between institutions.
Further lines of inquiry are, however, also worth pursuing. First, as
far as the outright seizure of institutions is concerned, it is questionable
that the agencies, because of their close relationship at the level of the
FDIC Board, should be in a position to engineer insolvencies merely in
order to be able to sell off more attractive institutions. A fairer solution
might be to require a clear institutional separation between the agencies
charged with supervising and closing institutions and the agency charged

with performing the receivership functions. (Here the RTC model might
be appropriate, except that under this model there might still be too
much contact between one of the supervisory agencies (FDIC) and the
receivership agency (RTC)).
Second, it is time for Congress and the courts to be more frank about
the punitive aspects of the banking agencies' cease-and-desist, removal
and prohibition, and civil money penalty powers. There is no doubt that
these enforcement powers were authorized and are being used (perhaps
even quite appropriately) in order to punish past wrongdoing as well as
to prevent further abuse and mismanagement. Nor is this necessarily
objectionable or incongruous, since the general and specific deterrent ef249. A reduction in the coverage of federal deposit insurance would be effected by the
Treasury' proposed legislation. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act,
H.R. 1505, § 101 [hereinafter FISCCA].
250. See id. § 103(a) (new § 13(c)(4)(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
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fects of such punitive action help to influence future decisions. But if the
enforcement powers can be used punitively, it is quite possible that they
will encourage heavy-handed regulation, with the regulator using the big
stick as a prophylactic measure-especially when the regulators are subjected to intense political pressure to engage in early intervention. It is at
this point that the wooden features of the formal enforcement powers
become unfair and quite possibly counterproductive.
A clearer distinction might profitably be drawn between those enforcement powers that refer to past violations and have a punitive effect (e.g.,
permanent removal and prohibition orders, civil penalties and restitution
orders) and those which are primarily designed to prevent further deterioration in the institution concerned (e.g., capital maintenance agreements, temporary removal orders and restrictions on "new financial
activity"2 5 1). The agencies could be subjected to stricter standards when
applying sanctions that are punitive in nature, so that they could not use
them as a means of bludgeoning institutions and their managements into
complying with agency requirements that are based merely on business
judgments and not on clear violations of rules or well-established unsafe
and unsound practices.
Third, and in implementation of the distinction between punitive and
remedial sanctions, it is possible that procedural and structural modifications within the agencies would help to maintain the barrier between
punishment and management. At least three possibilities could be
considered.
A helpful procedural modification, and one that has already been
urged by the Administrative Conference of the United States,25 2 might be
the adoption of an analogy to the "Wells Submission" employed by the
Persons faced with
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").2 5
the prospect of having formal enforcement action taken against them are
given an opportunity by the SEC to present a statement of their interest
and position in the dispute to the enforcement staff before the formal
action is actually instituted, even if such action has already been authorized by the Commission. One advantage of such a procedure in the
banking enforcement context is that it would bring into direct contact, on
a regular and centralized basis, the agency enforcement officials and the
persons with respect to whom enforcement action is being contemplated
before the dispute has assumed too adversarial a posture. This would
help to obviate the possibility that formal enforcement action might be
251. See FISCCA, supra note 248, § 251(a).
252. Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States, No. 8712, Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 1
C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1990) (Recommendation No. 5).
253. On Wells Submissions, see, e.g., J.D. Cox, R.W. Hillman & D.C. Langevoort,
Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1010-11 (1991); McLucas, Hamill, Shea &
Dubow, An Overview of Various ProceduralConsiderationsAssociated With the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Investigative Process, 45 Bus. Law. 627, 689-93.
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instituted upon the mere recommendation of officers in the field, many of
whom are not lawyers.
If more substantial measures turn out to be necessary, the model supplied by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") offers an example of a possible structural modification. The Labor-Management
Relations Act of 194725 created a structural division within the NLRB
25
between the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the agency. The General Counsel's office, which prosecutes unfair labor practice disputes before the Board, is independent of the Board's supervision and
review. Until a charge is brought by the General Counsel, the Board
may take no enforcement action." 6 Such a model goes further than the
present Administrative Procedure Act requirements applicable to the
banking agencies2 57 and might be appropriate for punitive enforcement
actions by the banking agencies. The enforcement staff at the agency
would be required to refer formally the prosecution of some of the
charges available to the agencies (civil money penalties, removals, etc.) to
the independent office, which, insulated from pressure by the agency itself, would then decide whether to bring formal charges. In the interim,
the agency itself could take emergency action where necessary through
the use of temporary orders (e.g., certain cease and desist orders and
suspensions), and it could prosecute other enforcement action which is
primarily corrective or preventative in nature (e.g., capital maintenance
agreements and restraints on new activities).
The second structural possibility is that of a more thorough-going
"split enforcement" model, such as those which operate in federal occupational safety and health and mine safety administration." 8 Under
such models, the responsibility for adjudicating enforcement proceedings
brought by the agency is assigned to a wholly independent agency. For
example, the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission
("OSHRC") adjudicates enforcement actions brought by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA"). Although there are
difficult problems of coordination and inter-agency deference involved," 9
254. 61 Stat. 136.
255. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 23, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 108
S. Ct. 413, 418-20 (1987); A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Cases and Materials on Labor
Law 104-07 (10th ed. 1986).
256. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 155-59 (1975).
257. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988)(providing for a functional separation between investigative and prosecuting staff on the one hand, and adjudicators on the other).
258. See Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Mode" Some Conclusions From the OSHA
and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987). A similar proposal has been
advocated for the enforcement of federal aviation safety regulations. See Fallon, Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Casefor a Split-EnforcementModel ofAgency Adjudication, 4 Admin. L.J. 389 (1991). The Administrative Conference of the United States
adopted many of Fallon's proposals, but not this one, in its own recommendations to the
Congress. I C.F.R. § 305.90-1 (1990).
259. See the discussion and guidelines expressed in the Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States, No. 86-4, The Split Enforcement Model for
Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1990). Cf Martin v. Occupational Safety and
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the split enforcement model is thought by many to ensure that persons
subjected to agency enforcement action are provided with, or at least will
feel that they have been provided with, fairer procedures and better protection from over-zealous regulators than is the case with a unitary adjudication system. 2" Given the potential and temptations for over-zealous
enforcement by the banking agencies, the same argument could be made
in the banking enforcement context. Indeed, it might even be argued
that enforcement adjudication should be centralized for all the federal
banking agencies, though an instant rejection of this suggestion would be
anticipated by anyone familiar with the turf-protecting proclivities of
each of these agencies.
000
These suggestions are somewhat tentative and obviously require careful further investigation, particularly in light of the general direction that
banking reform might take in the coming months. It does seem, however, that a more discriminating approach to the application by the banking agencies of their enforcement powers might be necessary, if charges
of agency abuse and unfairness are to be countered, and if the enforcement actions of the agencies are to be constructive in the long term.
Health Review Comm'n, lll S. Ct. 1171 (1991) (deciding that OSHRC should defer to
OSHA and the Secretary concerning interpretations of the Secretary's regulations).
260. See Fallon, supra note 258, at 419-20; Johnson, supra note 258, at 344-46.

